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Abstract
The general paradigm which spans this research has perhaps best been summarised by 
Mark Johnson when he wrote that; 'Meaning and thought emerge from our capacities 
for perception, object manipulation, and bodily movement'. (2007: p.113)
Knowledge, in all its forms, is a category of meaning and thought, and therefore also 
figures within these capacities.  The main purpose of this writing with be the detailed 
unpacking of this central idea with particular reference to the blog The Conference 
Report.
A major argument that I will be developing is that the particular forms of knowledge 
that we think of as 'objective' are thought of in that way for specific reasons, and that 
these reasons appear through the embodied capacities that Johnson specifies.  That is, 
through our capacities for perception, object manipulation, and bodily movement, a 
trilogy of factors to which I will be adding the fourth of 'space' (implied in his use of 
the term 'capacities').  I will suggest that the phenomenological notion of the 'object', 
which underpins the abstract concepts of 'objectivity', is more complex that might be 
immediately apparent, as are its relations with 'perception' and 'bodily movement', and 
indeed 'space'.  Whilst offering appropriate respect for scientific empiricism and 
logical deduction, I intend to demonstrate that the complexity of these capacities 
render certain aspirations toward the formulation of 'objective knowledge' 
problematic.
By placing objective knowledge in the wider conceptual framework of embodied 
cognition through the application of a theoretical line which runs through 
phenomenology, cognitive poetics, conceptual metaphor, and image schema, I hope to 
provide a framework that allows for the organised consideration of forms of knowing 
which do not aspire to the condition of the object.  These forms of knowing, it will be 
argued, may be instantiated and expressed through the medium of the blog from 
which some of this writing is drawn and to which some of it returns.
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Introduction
After a short preamble outlining its origins, this thesis will consider the status of the 
internet blog as a space through which knowledge might be acquired, accumulated, 
organised, or disseminated, giving something of an introduction to the acceptance of 
blogging and other non-print based epistemic forms within the academy.  From a 
discussion of media as carriers of (what might be perceived as) different types of 
knowledge, this writing, complementary to the blog, discusses how language tends to 
function in relation to epistemology, particularly the language of ‘objectivity’.
In order to unpack the functioning of language and media in relation to knowledge, an 
overview is given of the theoretical framework around which this document is based, and 
which features extensively in the blog The Conference Report
(http://theconferencereport.net).  This consists of an analysis drawing from a set of 
practices generally subsumed under the rubric of ‘embodied cognition’.  Particularly salient 
are ideas relating to ‘conceptual metaphor theory’ and ‘image schema’, which are described 
in detail below.  Here it is argued that certain uses of language and media give what is often 
covert support to an epistemology which awards special value to the ‘object’; it is further 
suggested that this usage may be inappropriate in the furtherance of knowledge which 
operates within a different epistemology, or more accurately, focuses on a different aspect 
of the overall epistemological ‘landscape’.
As a way of identifying what might be considered the ‘lie of the land’ that a cognitively 
embodied epistemology might map, three established systems of knowledge organization 
will be examined: Michael Polanyi’s Tacit Dimension, the 
Proactive/Performative/Possessive continuum of educationalist David Perkins, and the 
Date-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom Hierarchy (DIKW) used in the Knowledge 
Management industry, and chiefly associated with Ackoff.  Through this analysis 
consistencies in the metaphorical schema that these systems draw from will be identified, 
with particular attention paid to common understandings of perception (which is not limited 
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to the visual), the status of ‘objects’, and the potential for manipulation and movement 
within conceptual space.
This is followed by a more detailed analysis of one aspect of the schema which these 
systems all seem to include, which (after Perkins) I refer to as the performative.  This 
concept is related to parts of Polanyi’s model and to features within the DIKW Hierarchy, 
and this suggests that it has particular significance to ways of knowing which do not tend to 
follow an empirical method to its objective conclusion.  Included within this section is an 
analysis of how the concepts of touching and walking might figure within the overall
schema.
Finally, the blog as a space within which knowing might take place is further discussed, 
with an argument being advanced that it suggests an epistemology based less on the scopic 
and objective, but rather on the tactile and the ambulatory.  Precisely because this thesis 
problematises the ‘objective’, I shall consciously shift between first person narrative and 
more traditional academic discourse in what follows.  This shifting of discursive position is 
discussed in more detail below, together with a consideration of the implications of 
adopting the passive voice in contrast to the first person perspective, (see 18ff).  This 
variation in tone will be shown to be a common feature of blog writing, including the blog 
to which this document refers.  
The main body of this dissertation is in the form of a blog and is therefore ideally accessed 
online at http://theconferencereport.net.   If this should not be possible there is an archival 
copy of the entire blog, together with appendices and complementary materials, in the CD 
at the back of this document.
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Preamble
‘ It may be that universal history is the history of a handful of metaphors’ (Borges, 
1962: p.224).
This complementary document is written to accompany the blog The Conference Report,
itself a range of writings, which comprises the bulk of my doctoral submission.  By way of 
entering the writing I would like to say a few things about the blog; how it came about, how 
it gets written, what gets left out, and how it works (if it works).
Most mornings I take my dogs, Phoebe and Guy, for a walk along the canal.  We cut up and 
go along the Salt Line, which is the old disused railway line where the trains used to take 
the salt from Northwich and Middlewich to the Potteries.  Then we cross a field that has an 
old white horse in it.  The horse was owned by a young girl who died tragically, and the 
girl’s mother couldn’t bear to part with it.  Sometimes the horse stands facing the wall, its 
head inches away.  There is an oak tree in the field that I take a picture of whenever I pass; 
I take it from the same spot each time.
On these walks I usually talk to myself, usually silently but sometimes out loud.  
Occasionally I find myself gesturing while I am thinking aloud, and sometimes passers-by 
look at me in a funny way.  I keep doing it though because the gesturing makes it easier for 
me to put the thoughts together in satisfying ways.
For a while I took notebooks with me and would stop occasionally to write down what I 
was thinking, but I kept losing the notebooks, and anyway, the dogs didn’t like it when I 
stopped.  They liked the steady, three miles per hour rambling that accompanied their 
sniffing, and digging, and barking.
When I got home I would sit by the laptop with a cup of coffee and write down whatever I 
had been thinking about, but detached from the walk, and the horse, and the canal, and the 
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oak tree, it didn’t make much sense, so I started thinking about horses, and water, and trees, 
and writing about those things.
Then I started to worry that if my laptop crashed I would lose everything, like I lost my 
notebooks, so I started a blog where everything would be safe.  The internet is everywhere 
so anything you put on the internet is everywhere.  Everything I thought about I put on the 
blog, and that seemed to be mostly about trees, and space, and walking, and occasionally 
about dogs.
Fred McVittie
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What is a Blog?
A blog is a basic content management system for the online delivery of information and the 
archiving of that information.  It is one of a range of screen-based media forms which use 
the features of the web environment (including recent developments often referred to as 
‘Web 2.0’ and the ‘semantic web’) to create, share, and distribute original and found 
material.
The form of the blog has been identified by Stephen Downes (2004) as partially reflecting 
its dual origins as both a space for personal ‘diary’ type reflection by the blogger and also 
as a place where other sites which may be of interest to the reader are  brought together and 
‘logged’, and it is still the case that many blogs foreground one or other of these functions.  
This is the case for the wider ‘blogosphere’ but also within the narrower domain of arts-
related blogging.  The Networked Performance blog1 for example, acts as a node for the 
synthesis of news items, information, and event promotion originating across a range of 
different sites.  Others, such as those listed at Artists Blogs2, tend to contain more personal 
material with relatively little reference to outside sources.  This variable combination of 
personal expression (which in artists blogs typically includes documentation of artworks), 
and the collation of content from other sources produces an interesting mix of intertextual 
quotation and material which makes more of a claim to originality or subjective expression.
Structurally the blog has a passing similarity to a number of other digital knowledge forms, 
most specifically the hypertext and the wiki, and it may be useful to consider some of these 
similarities, and also the significant differences. Also, the paradigmatic difference between 
all of these digital forms and the analogue form of print material are sufficiently large to 
warrant special attention.
Apart from obvious material differences, and the equally obvious variations in access 
afforded by technologies of knowledge which use the screen rather than the page, there is 
little that can be bound between the pages of a book that cannot be put onto a screen. As 
                                                
1 http://transition.turbulence.org/blog/  (Accessed 17/06/08)
2 http://art-blogging.blogspot.com/  (Accessed 17/06/08)
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has been noted by  Kevin Brooks, Cindy Nichols and Sybil Priebe (2005), in this respect 
the blog can be seen as an example of ‘remediation’ (Bolter and Grusin, 1999), in which 
‘the language of cultural interfaces is largely made up from elements of other, already 
familiar cultural forms’ (Manovich, 2001: 71). Conversely however, the technologies of the 
digital environment offer the possibility of including types of information, (video, sound, 
animation), which cannot be reproduced in analogue form. More importantly, digital media 
offers ways of navigating information, and indeed structuring information, which are 
radically different to the book, essay, monograph, article, or thesis.
The two most significant strategies for the reading of digital material, and which distinguish 
it from print media, are the browse, and the search. Browsing allows the reader to move 
through the text in a way which is non-linear, and therefore requires that the author of that 
text take into account this non-linearity in their writing. Typically this may involve the 
presentation of a number of different ways into and out of a specific piece of information. 
The familiar links on a web page which invite the browsing reader to follow the logic of 
their own reading process is an obvious example. This has the effect that most digital 
knowledge resources have the feeling of a network rather than a story or argument; in 
writing a piece that follows the logic of the browse the writer cannot rely on the linear and 
sequential moving through of material.  Remaining within a network of information 
predicated on browsing may allow the reader to accumulate knowledge represented within 
that network, but there is no guarantee that this process will be orderly or constrained to the 
precise intentions of the writer.  
The logic of the browse, at least for most online resources, also blurs the edges of the text 
such that the most casual click on a link takes the reader imperceptibly across the planet to 
information on another server, another site, another body of text. This trailing into and out 
of the home text may be formalised in the language of the deli.cio.us tag list3, for example, 
or may appear more covertly behind the hexadecimal blue of an unfollowed link word. This 
intertextual feature of digital technology, and particularly online resources, has been widely 
                                                
3 Del.icio.us is a ‘social bookmarking’ service which allows users to maintain and share links to 
interesting websites online.  The links associated with this project can be found at 
http://delicious.com/conferencereport (accessed 01/08/08).
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referred to as providing a material instantiation of postmodern, poststructuralist concepts 
which previously were purely theoretical.  Although this aspect of the practice is outside 
the main focus of this analysis, to be laid out below, some of the examples referred to do 
look to such sources for theoretical underpinning. 
The serendipity of the browse as a reading strategy is complemented within many digital 
forms with the search. Searching gives the opportunity to the reader of making a proactive 
entrance into the body of the text. Search results respond to the desire of the reader, who 
may disregard any obvious and sanctioned reading order in favour of a specific probing 
advance. Not only that, but search also organises and edits the entirety of the text into a 
collation thematically arranged under the heading of the search term. The hypermedia 
writer may assist such acts of collative creation by the use of suggested search terms or 
labels, and in the blog The Conference Report that forms the body of this thesis these 
search terms are referred to as the index.
These systems of knowledge construction and retrieval are common to many digital media 
products. The specific forms noted above, the blog and the wiki, add specific additional 
features to this list which increase their distinction from print media. The defining feature 
of the wiki is that it is (usually) a collaborative form. Its charm is that large, sometimes 
very large, groups of people have access and editing rights and can add, subtract, or change
the content of the wiki at any time. This feature of multiple editorial access gives the wiki a 
‘hands-on’ appeal but may also prejudice the status of the knowledge so constructed.  As is 
developed below, one of the desirable features of knowledge which aspires to objectivity 
and permanence is that it is located beyond the reach of the tinkering hands of the under-
qualified or the willfully destructive.  The credibility issues associated with much of the 
material on the extensive and influential wiki, Wikipedia, is perhaps the best example of 
this epistemological uncertainty, to the extent that, at the time of writing, some universities 
forbid the use of Wikipedia references in student essays, despite the fact that a 2005 study 
in the journal Nature found little empirical difference in the credibility of information 
found on Wikipedia and that in the Encyclopedia Britannica (Giles, 2005).
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Like the wiki, the blog also has the option of allowing collaborative creation, although this 
is usually only to the extent of facilitating the attachment of comments to a posting.  Whilst 
comments may present opposing information or points of view, the original content of the 
blog is not over-written and thus maintains (literally) high visibility and primacy.  The 
other, and perhaps most unique, feature of blogs is that any posting on a blog is time-
stamped, which gives a layer of structure that is largely absent from wikis and from 
hypertext or web media more generally.
Time stamping means firstly that blogs tend to reflect, and reflect upon, events and issues 
which are contemporaneous in a way which is impossible in other media. Whilst it is 
certainly true that a book or article will usually try to be current, and to include an up-to-
date set of references and referents, it would be unusual for these references to change from 
one page to the next. This is exactly what one would expect from a blog however; as events 
transpire in the wider world, or in the slightly less wide discipline to which the blog refers, 
then the writing on the blog shifts to include these events. New discoveries and 
developments in relevant practices are dynamically related to the times in which the blog is 
written, and the progress of the blog reflects these dynamic changes. This is particularly 
evident with blogs that address topics which proceed rapidly; political or ‘warblogs’4 for 
example.  Those which are focused on ‘theory’ or academic practice tend to be more slow 
moving, as Jodi Dean writes in the Bad Subjects blog;
(T)he emphasis on speed overlooks a key feature of blogs—they are 
archives, specific accountings of the passage of time that can then be 
explored, returned to, dug up. At any rate, my point is that the temporality 
of theory blogs is not that of action news, of the reflex conditioned to 
conform to the hegemonic organization of time spans in terms of specific 
seasons, cliff hangers, or perpetual urgency. Nor is it the same as the 
temporality of the face to face seminar, the pressure to respond 
immediately in the classroom or academic meeting. Instead, it is a more 
thoughtful, human time. The time one wants to take and is willing to offer 
(Dean, 2006).
                                                
4 Blogs which provide information and commentary either from war zones or which are directly 
related to military conflicts include Blogs of War (http://www.blogsofwar.com/) , and the more general 
Milblogging (http://milblogging.com/) which is, as the strap line on the website phrases it “a daily snapshot of 
the top milblogs, milblogs by country, and other cool stuff in the military blogosphere”. (Accessed 
15/06/2008).
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The slower pace of academic blogging noted by Dean suggests a less immediately reactive 
response to events and a more considered, reflective engagement.  Supporting this less 
frenetic pacing is the necessity within academic blogs, as within the wider practice of 
academia, not only to acknowledge current practice but also to recognize the 
epistemological history which has led to this moment. In this passage, Dean notes the 
particular significance of the archival aspects of blogs, a feature missing from wikis and 
other media forms.  The history of past postings is always accessible such that the reader 
has the option not only to read the most contemporary entry, which in most blogs is 
presented at the top of the first page, but may also track the history and development of a 
story, idea, or concern.
On a more personal, processual level, as information becomes available to bloggers through 
the course of their own experience and study, then this too makes a gradual appearance. 
Rather than the entire document appearing as if it were written at one sitting, in the full 
light of acquired knowledge, as is often the case with the book, there is the gradual 
accumulation of the light, and the progressive journey through different knowledge sources.  
This will be evident in The Conference Report blog as a developing set of concerns and 
interests (what I have referred to in the blog itself as ‘a tongue returning to a broken 
tooth’5).  As I have accumulated more knowledge relevant to the broad set of concerns 
which feature in the blog, so the entries tend to reflect this accumulation.  This means that 
ideas are often returned to several times as new information has come to bear on the 
process.
The blog, then, has a temporal structure which is absent from other digital media forms, and 
which is absent from print. Firstly it is located across a swathe of historical time rather than 
a cross-section, which gives it an internal structure inferring growth, progress, and change. 
Secondly it is embedded and interconnected to the moving moment of contemporaneity at 
multiple points and many different levels. Some bloggers have utilized this feature of 
temporal sequencing to use the blog as a site for the delivery of narrative fiction, which 
                                                
5 This blog entry is available at http://theconferencereport.net/2008/04/02/a-tongue-returning-to-a-
broken-tooth/ and is the transcript of the video on the Video Log (vlog) which forms appendix to the main 
blog site.  The video can be viewed at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zyMuQsjhLZw
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tends to be similarly time-bound in form.  Perhaps the most well-known example of this 
usage is ‘Belle du Jour: diary of a London Call Girl’6 which won an award for best blog by 
the Guardian newspaper (Waldman, 2003).  In this and similar works, the narrative is 
delivered in installments over days, weeks, or longer, with the avid reader visiting the site 
regularly to receive updates on the progress of the narrative.  This particular blog has 
subsequently been reverse remediated into book (De Jour, 2005) and television (Prebble, 
2007) format. 
This date-stamping not only locates each blog entry in a temporal sequence such that 
today’s entry evidently follows yesterday’s, it also places it within the wider, but highly 
specific, cultural moment of its writing.  This is particularly pertinent with current affairs, 
political, or fashion-related blogs in which the most current information or most recent 
research is usually the most valuable.  As with narrative blogs, whilst such sites typically 
encourage the reader to access the most recent information first, there is also an assumption 
that previous entries have already been read, or at least could be read.   The procession of 
entries which lead to the most recent are easily accessible, either on the page itself or as 
archive entries accessed via the sidebar7.  The temporal sequence that blogging articulates 
is therefore firmly established as a structural element in the overall blog ‘artifact’.
Blogging Knowledge
Because of the relatively recent development of hypermedia forms, and particularly blogs, 
there is inevitably far less use of these forms as media for the encapsulation and 
dissemination of new knowledge.  Most web-based media which draws on wiki or blog 
technology tends to be used by academic communities for the distribution and transfer of 
existing knowledge, rather than as a space within which new knowledge might be 
instantiated. In this respect it may be the case that blogging is, as yet, an underused 
technology. Within the knowledge management (KM) community the status of blogs is part 
                                                
6 http://belledejour-uk.blogspot.com/
7 A sidebar is a standard feature of many websites, including blogs, and consists of a part of the 
screen, usually the left or right side, which contains the navigation elements of the site.  The sidebar is usually 
consistent throughout the site, in contrast with the main part of the screen which contains variable contents.
Fred McVittie
11
of a wider discussion concerning the differences between knowledge which is visible and 
available and that which is not.  As Lilia Efimova (2004) reports, within KM it is reckoned 
that only 20% of knowledge that is owned and used by individuals is made available.  This, 
she argues, is due to a historical focus on ‘scientific’ methods of management in which 
productivity is linked to specific, tangible, object-like outcomes.  She goes on to argue that 
this necessarily oversteps the much greater percentage of knowledge work that is carried 
out and which does not have such clearly identifiable explicit results.  The historical 
invisibility of this knowledge work may be, in part, due to the lack of simple and efficient 
methods for capturing and disseminating this less object-like knowledge.  In this respect the 
particular features of blogs as noted above, as well as other non-blog specific aspects of 
web-based media; linking, RSS feeds8, integration of multimedia elements etc.; may 
facilitate their use as tools for making available this invisible 80%. 
As noted above, blogs currently span a wide range of uses including highly personal, diary-
like writings, works of serial fiction, news and current affairs reporting, artist’s blogs which 
often act as online galleries, and academic blogs.  Regarding these uses, in an influential 
article for the online academic blog ‘Into the Blogosphere’, Torill Mortensen writes,
In January, 2004, there was a discussion of categories in blogs among 
academic bloggers. Danah Boyd (2004a) excluded journals and diaries 
when she talked of blogs, and with Liz Lawley she expressed the need for 
a conference on how blogs should be classified (2004b). Categories, rules 
of form, studies of genre and structure, these are the criteria of a pure taste 
as opposed to the barbaric taste (Bourdieu, 1984, pp. 30-31). While the 
barbaric taste values sensuous enjoyment, the object of pleasure 
appreciated for the sake of emotional or immediate pleasure, the pure taste 
is for the educated and culturally sophisticated, those who have learned to 
appreciate the abstract values, the rules underlying an abstract painting, the 
play with genre and the understanding history and context.  (Mortensen, 
2004.  Citations in original) 
There is in this quotation from Mortensen the recognition that acceptable academic activity, 
and therefore acceptable ‘knowledge’ is hedged in by rules of form. Citing Pierre Bourdieu, 
it is claimed that the pure taste of authentic knowledge is acquired by a distinction from the 
                                                
8 An RSS feed allows for the changing content of a websit or blog to be embedded within another 
site.  So for example, a news site might provide synopses of some of its content in the form of RSS feeds 
which users can then embed within their home page so that it can be easily accessed.
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‘barbaric’, based, at least partially, on genre, structure, categories, and these rules of form.  
When applied to blogging, the structure, genre, and rules of form of which are still very 
much in development, it may be the case that such a distinction is less easy to make9.  This 
suggests that, whilst blogs may indeed be useful in capturing and preserving knowledge 
which would otherwise remain invisible and uncommunicated, it is likely that the academic 
value of blogs as knowledge artifacts may require close arguing.  Certainly the more genre-
specific and formal elements (multimedia, intertextual openness, temporal locatedness) and 
the structural possibilities (navigation which includes browsing and searching) may not 
meet the established criteria for the tasteful transparency of hegemonic knowledge.
Despite the abovementioned difficulties in accommodating the practice of blogging within 
an epistemology which meets acceptable standards of academic rigor, it is beginning to be 
acknowledged that this and similar forms such as the wiki might indeed be treated as 
knowledge vehicles.  For example, the research methodology adopted by Anne Galloway 
for her thesis on Urban Computing and Locative Media largely consists of her blog Purse 
Lip Square Jaw (2008b).  The topic of Galloway’s thesis is evidently within an area that 
lends itself to the kind of theorization that overlaps with a critique of the construction of 
knowledge through formal distinction, (she cites Bourdieu at various points, although not 
self-referentially within an analysis of her blog itself).  Instead of mounting a critique on 
epistemological traditions which might deprivilege her non-traditional process she argues 
instead that ‘methodological bricolage is particularly well suited to tackle the 
indeterminacy and contingency of social and cultural knowledge in the early years of the 
21st century’10.  She is therefore arguing that her particular use of the blog form matches a 
type of knowing appropriate to the times and the media that her work addresses.
My dissertation, then, weaves together theoretical and analytical 
discussion with multiple genres of text: scholarly quotes, survey and 
interview excerpts, blog posts, news stories, personal reflections, etc. And 
it is precisely in their entangled differences that the reader is invited to 
                                                
9 Within the discussion that follows Mortensen’s posting, it is suggested that the blogging format 
supports a writing style more suited to female writers; one in which the personal and the ‘objective’ are not 
separated.  Although this viewpoint is not one from which I am arguing, some of its supporting framework, 
particularly Cixous’ ecriture feminine, is alluded to below.  
10 From the introduction, at time of writing available online at 
http://www.purselipsquarejaw.org/papers/Galloway_Dissertation_Intro_Draft.pdf  (Accessed 17/06/08)
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join. By following my zig-zagging paths, and remaining open to 
understanding things according to their own logic rather than imposing a 
singular or stable logic to control them, the reader becomes an active 
producer of her own knowledge rather than a passive consumer of 
academic wisdom  (Galloway, 2008a: 4)
This statement, from the draft introduction, alludes to exactly the kind of poststructuralist 
paradigms of knowledge construction and the ‘readerly text’ that one finds in Roland 
Barthes (1976) and Michel Foucault (1988).  It is this form of theorization that George 
Landow (1992) and others offer as strategies for recognizing bricolage as structure and 
provides the ‘rules of form’ which Bourdieu claims as conferring tasteful knowledge status 
on the material.
Whilst the practice of blogging is a relatively recent phenomenon, the use of hypertext and 
hypermedia forms as knowledge conveyance is well established.  One of the earliest, and 
best documented, examples from the U.K. is Cornelius Holtorf’s work within the field of 
archeology (1998).  His dissertation, a hypermedia exploration of megaliths in an area of 
Germany, was written and submitted as a web document, effectively readable only online 
(although he was also required to submit a ‘hard copy’ in CD format) and this submission 
was accepted by the University of Wales in 1998.  It is currently available on the web11, 
together with extensive documentation of not only the primary research, but also the 
process through which this format for submission was argued as acceptable.  Holtorf 
subsequently outlined this use of the online hypertextual document as an appropriate 
epistemological form in the web journal Internet Archeology (Holtorf, 1999).
In a response to Holtorf’s article, published in the same issue of Internet Archeology, Andre 
Costopoulos suggests that the rather extensive dialogue that seemed to take place between 
Holtorf and the university authorities prior to the acceptance of the proposal might have 
been due to reservations about the status of knowledge presented in this format.  He claims 
that non-linear writing is unsuitable to 'the spirit of scientific enterprise’ (1999b) apparently 
arguing for a kind of positivist epistemology which, whilst it may be necessary for certain 
scientific endeavors, was certainly not deemed uniquely appropriate for the articulation of 
knowledge in this particular field. 
                                                
11 https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/handle/1807/245  (Accessed 17/06/08)
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Holtorf’s response12 to Costopoulos on the Jiscmail list related to the Internet Archeology
journal makes it clear that no such concerns were raised by the various academic authorities 
regarding the epistemological status of this kind of submission, either in terms of its content
or its necessary mode of reading.  The only questions asked were in relation to storage and 
access; points which were easily and satisfactorily addressed.
Holtorf in fact makes an extensive argument for the understanding of hypertext as a vehicle 
for the delivery of original research in which he cites, among others, George Landow and 
Jay Bolter (noted above).  In this he argues a case paralleling that made subsequently by 
Anne Galloway in relation to the writing in Purse Lip Square Jaw, ultimately resting on a 
complementarity between poststructuralist thought and the protocols of web-based media.13  
It may be noted in passing that Costopoulos’ own doctoral thesis was also submitted in 
hypermedia format (1999a), and whilst the structure of the main document essentially 
followed the rules of form typically associated with a text-based submission, including the 
linearity which he seems to regard as a formal requirement if one is to abide by the ‘spirit 
of scientific endeavor’, it did make extensive use of the facility within hypermedia of 
including content which would not fit between the pages of a book.
Another example of academic research emerging from online practice is Christine Boese’s 
‘The Ballad of the Internet Nutball: Chaining Rhetorical Vision from the Margins of the 
Margins to the Mainstream in the Xenaverse’ (Boese, 1998), which was the first doctoral 
thesis awarded in the United States to embrace the possibilities of online media.  A 
particularly interesting aspect of this work was the inclusion of numerous other voices 
within the submission.  The community of users that Boese joined and interacted with, 
largely fans of the T.V. show ‘Xena Warrior Princess’, contributed considerable amounts of 
the content which ultimately embodied the thesis.  The argument constructed by Boese for 
the significance of the form, and particularly of the inclusion of this polyphonal writing, 
again draws on Landow, Bolter, and others, but also stresses the political dimension of 
                                                
12 http://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind9905&L=intarch-interest&F=&S=&P=1293  
(Accessed 17/06/08)
13 https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/citd/holtorf/3.9.html  (Accessed 17/06/08)
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knowledge construction (alluded to in Bourdieu, above), citing Foucault and Habermas, and 
the language of ‘critical research praxis’.14
Another pioneer in this area is Virginia Kuhn, who submitted her thesis in multimedia (but 
not online) format in 1998 and met with some difficulties regarding the status of such a 
submission.  These concerns were unrelated to the academic or epistemological viability of 
the content of this submission however, but referred to the extensive inclusion of images 
and film clips; a possibility only afforded by the nature of the medium.  These reservations 
revolved around the issue of copyright and intellectual property law; and it was feared that 
such inclusions would contravene these statutes.  However, it was successfully argued, by 
Kuhn and the University of Wisconsin that the established principle of Fair Use 
traditionally applied to textual quotations also applied to these multimedia elements.  A 
report of this ‘Digital Dissertation Dust Up’, as it was phrased, featured in the Chronicle of 
Higher Education (Monaghan, 2006), and was a lively topic within the academic corners of 
the blogosphere15. 
These early incursions of digital, non-linear, multimedia, polyphonal, objects into the realm 
of academic publishing have enormously enriched the area and advanced the credibility of 
these knowledge forms, the laws of which overstep the jurisdiction of the traditional ‘book’ 
format.  This is an area of practice which has also moved on considerably since these 
examples noted above opened up these possibilities.  The website and blog if:book a 
project of the institute for the future of the book 16 maintains an invaluable repository and 
ongoing discourse along these increasingly well-drawn lines.
The Conference Report
The writing in the blog The Conference Report was conceived of as both comprising and 
internally reflecting upon the research leading to a Ph.D. submission; acting as a repository 
                                                
14 Boese’ full argument is available at http://www.nutball.com/dissertation/mains/Line2.html#L27 
(Accessed 17/06/08)
15 http://www.serendipit-e.com/serendipite/2006/05/xena_dissertati.html  (Accessed 17/06/08)
16 http://www.futureofthebook.org/blog/  (Accessed 17/06/08)
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for the various wayward ideas, both relevant and somewhat tangential, that developed over 
the period of its writing. In terms of the distinction noted by Downes, above, it was my 
intention that it function partly as a collation of ideas from elsewhere and partly a space of 
personal expression and creative play.  Because of my admiration for the work of the Polish 
author Stanislaw Lem I chose initially to frame these sometimes purposive, sometimes 
nomadic thoughts within a literary conceit, a technique which Lem used in a number of his 
imaginative fictions (1991b, 1991a).  The conceit I elected to use was that the blog was the 
report of a fictional conference, a space which offers the unusual literary form of the 
conference abstract.  
Although I moved away from a close adherence to this conceit quite early on in the process 
of that writing, the status of the conference abstract is nevertheless relevant to how the rest 
of this writing is working.  It may be useful to consider the particular ontology I am 
awarding to the idea of the abstract since this conceptualisation informs not only that 
original conceit but also the blog in its entirety. 
Poetic Abstractions17
The abstract for an academic conference can perhaps be seen as poised between two 
different poles of knowing and being18. On the one hand is the apparently transparent 
revealing of the full paper, representational and scopic in its claim for truth, realism, and 
authenticity. Here is knowledge in the public domain, fully visible, fully referenced, and 
solidly objective as a rock or a book. This is the direction in which the abstract leans and 
toward which it directs our gaze. On the other hand is the subject and origin of those ideas, 
the person from whom it is emitted, with all of the irretrievable tacit knowledge and 
personal wisdom that comprises their being. Between these hands is this slightly odd not-
                                                
17 This short section on the status of the conference paper abstract is lifted from the blog The 
Conference Report’, to which this writing refers.   The writing style, it may be noted, is slightly different and 
more allusory or figurative in tone.  This variation in the extent to which the writing is overtly poetic, or 
conversely the extent to which the figurative language is suppressed, is a variable that I am consciously 
manipulating in the blog.  This is discussed further below.
18 The understandings of ‘knowing and being’ that I am referring to here are discussed below with 
reference to Polanyi’s use of these terms.
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quite-object of the abstract; what I am thinking of as the performance, the experiment, the 
experience, the processual step and the moment of coming-into-being which is external to 
the subject but precedes the object. It is ephemeral, artistic, and phenomenal and is 
upstream from all writing; we are carried swiftly on, the illumination casts shadows on the 
page, the video of the performance misses the moment when the dancer’s foot is at just this 
angle.
Abstracts for conferences, from my experience, are often far more engaging than the full 
papers to which they refer. A well-articulated abstract not only outlines a set of findings or 
lays out the terms of a new piece of analysis, it also achieves something of the status of an 
artwork, compressing extensive polyphonal expressions into a single, dense piece of prose. 
There is something engagingly ludic about such writing; when done well it reveals the 
swings and roundabouts of conceptualisation and invites us to play on these for a while, 
before the more formal fencing off of that area that will take place during the full 
exposition of the paper. Metaphorical images and performances flow and strut across the 
paragraphs with an unfettered air of poetic freedom that is often suppressed in the more 
extensive discursions.
So whilst the writings in the blog submitted here are not confined to the form of abstracts 
for non-existent academic papers, it is my intention that the writings do traverse what I see 
as this oddly liminal, ‘performative’, space, (bearing in mind that the term ‘performative’ 
has a varied and interesting history, which will be partially opened up in this writing 
below.)  In this instance I am indicating a space of performance which is perhaps also 
indicated in this reading of the status of the conference abstract; sometimes reaching 
forward into the objective space ahead and touching the material of hard facts and shared 
knowledge, sometimes falling backwards toward the point of origin.19  
A second theme which emerged some time into the writing of the blog was that other 
conference, the Conference of the Birds, a 12th Century poem by Farid-Al-Din Attar 
(Farid-al-Din and Nott, 1974).  Although this work is not cited in the blog, the sense of an 
                                                
19 It should perhaps be noted that the blog has produced a number of ‘outcomes’ in the form of full 
conference papers and related artworks.  One of these artworks consists of these conference abstracts
compiled into the form of a series of hypothetical conferences.  See website.
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allegorical ‘journey of discovery’ that it presents, in which the journey itself is revealed to 
be the goal, has some resonance.  The writing produced in the blog over a period of three 
years is accompanied by a range of ‘outcomes’; artworks, conference papers, and journal 
publications; and whilst there is a sense in which these objects of practice can be seen as 
lying at the end of the research process which the blog narrates, these artifacts are not the 
focus of this submission.  The aim is rather to treat the research process, as recorded and 
expressed within the blog, as a space created by the writing through which the reader is 
invited to move.  Movement within the space of the blog, like the journey of the birds in 
Attar’s poem, is not intended to take one to a place where the object of knowledge can be 
found.  The moving itself, across a digital textual terrain in which a range of writing styles 
are deployed, is the object of study.  As such, it is enmeshed in the problematic of all 
‘practice as research’ wherein (typically written) documentation of the process might be 
seen inappropriately to be, or to stand in for, the process itself.  A key aim in this project 
has been to explore the specificity of blogging as simultaneously a process and the 
documentation of a process.
This property of blogging, in which different modes of writing might coexist, and thus 
traverse this intermediary space between the subject and object, the body and the book, is 
one which I am particularly interested in exploring.  To this end I will not be making 
extensive use of some of those features exploited by the bloggers cited above; comments 
are disabled so there are no other contributory voices; all of the material is either my own 
or follows established rules of Fair Use as applied to textual quotation; the use of 
multimedia is minimal within the main body of the blog (although there are several hours 
of video material in the Youtube ‘vlog’ appended to the main document as a link).  Features 
I am making most deliberate use of include the temporal embeddedness of blogging which, 
as stated earlier, both ties the individual postings to a particular moment in the history of its 
own writing, and also structures successive postings along a timeline, with the possible 
narrative and developmental structure such temporal organization implies.  Also, the 
archive feature, with its categorial browse and search functions, is an inevitable and 
necessary navigational tool.
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Method of Analysis
The following outlines the status of the knowledge presented in the blog The Conference 
Report in relation to a range of different understandings of what the term ‘knowledge’ 
signifies.  One of the most common ways in which artifacts of knowledge are organised and 
are distinguished one from another is through their designation as either objective or 
subjective, and this distinction is accompanied by a range of value judgments and use-
specific assumptions which serve to reinforce these categories as distinct and, for the most 
part, unproblematic.  It is fundamental within the empirical sciences that only objective 
knowledge is permissible,20 largely because of the inherent difficulties of finding effective 
ways to mobilise knowledge located only in the Subject, (although the pursuit of a form of 
knowing which acknowledges the first-person perspective is at the heart of the 
phenomenological approach). In a sense this distinction, (and I use this terms in both its 
literal and Bourdieu’s sense) is one in which the politics of knowledge is echoed in the 
substance of its instantiation. To the extent that this blog lies between the book and the 
body it also lies between the hard object of formal empiricism and the soft centre of a 
phenomenological, embodied knowing.  
The systematic tendency in the Academy to acknowledge objectivity and ignore 
subjectivity is, I will argue, also found outside of the hard sciences and, despite some 
understandable but misguided resistance, forms the foundations for procedures of 
knowledge authentication in the arts and humanities. As a way of articulating this 
distinction I will be carrying out an analysis of the language games which are used in the 
explication of these two, apparently distinct, knowledge forms, as well as of more specific 
epistemological systems. Drawing on a set of ideas emerging from cognitive linguistics, 
experiential philosophy, and embodied cognition, and specifically the work of George 
Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Eleanor Rosch, Rafael Nunez, and others, I will argue that 
within the discourses of epistemological systems different metaphors, metonyms and image 
schema structure the relevant concepts.  Moreover, there is a coherent and consistent 
pattern in which these metaphors and schema are used: some of the terms already in play 
(hard and soft, object and subject, between, beyond, high, process, and location) will be 
                                                
20 This is the assumption made by Costopoulos, above.
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included in this analysis. Following the theorists cited, I will be noting that knowledge 
which is understood as existing at the objective end of the spectrum makes extensive use of 
metaphors related to the act of seeing, including the entailments of visual awareness such as 
the presence of light and the placement of the object of knowledge in an external space. 
Subjective knowledge, on the other hand, is much more likely to make use of metaphors 
related to taste (or smell). Again, I will refer to some of those named above in claiming that 
the entailments associated with this latter metaphorical understanding support the 
conceptualisation associated with subjectivity; interiority, unilateral experiencing, and 
proximity to the core self of the experiencer. 
I will further argue that between these two extremes of seeing and tasting, and the binary 
division in knowledge which they suggest, is a zone of possible metaphorical engagement 
based on the haptic sense; the reaching, touching, stroking, and caressing of the human 
hand (and in a further development the reaching out toward the ground that the human foot 
makes in walking). Knowledge constructed around the metaphor of the hand allows the 
object of such knowledge to be either grasped or rebuffed. Haptic knowing, I will claim, 
allows for both the claiming and possession of information that subjects require, but also 
the open-handedness and baton-passing that marks the public-spirited scientist. Relating 
this to the blog The Conference Report, I will suggest that the technological circumstances 
for such tactile and ambulatory empiricism is already with us in the form of Web 2.0, the 
collection of database-driven, interactive, user-generated web environments characterised 
by MySpace, Facebook, Amazon, Wikipedia, and most specifically, Blogger and related 
sites. The knowledge present on such sites is always in time and in flux and ranges from 
personal reflection and comment to the most rigorously researched outcomes of the 
scientific method.  Thus another aspect of this research into the processes of blogging and
their implications for knowledge production, is the exploration of an apparently systemic 
disposition to blur the established objective/subjective boundaries.  The key features of this 
network of knowledge are instantiated in the form of its protocols, and thus in the means by 
which it facilitates epistemological creation and management.  Crafted and moulded by the 
efforts of the end-users, such sites can perhaps be seen as paradigmatic examples of haptic 
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knowledge, and can provide models of how we might come to know in ways which slip 
between the eye and the tongue.
Practice as Research
At the time of writing, and within the academy in the U.K. there is a lively debate taking 
place regarding how an understanding of practice (by which is usually meant some kind of 
artmaking) might be aligned with the concept of research (which is generally 
acknowledged as relating to the generation of new knowledge and significant insight).  In 
the course of this debate the phrase practice as research (PaR) and its variants (practice-led 
research, research-driven practice, etc.) has acquired something of a political dimension 
along which various positions might be adopted.   Broadly speaking, at one extreme there 
are some who claim that art is a form of knowledge which requires no explication beyond 
itself, and at the other it is argued that the objects of knowledge must, by nature, exist in a 
common communicable form (words written in organised sentences, forming coherent 
propositions, bound between the covers of a book, for example) if it is to be part of a 
cumulative, progressive exercise.21  This submission may be said to fall across and between 
these extremes, as well as self-reflexively commenting upon its own epistemology.
Particularly pertinent to this thesis is work carried out by Robin Nelson (2006) in which 
PaR is interrogated as a concept within the terms of shifting and contested epistemologies. 
After placing ‘the problem of knowledge’ within an historical, post-enlightenment context, 
Nelson elucidates some of the key agendas around the status of different knowledge-
creating practices, particularly in regard to poststructuralist ideas and theories.  The 
trajectory described is one in which knowledge moves from position of  ideal and elevated 
matter perhaps best illustrated in Plato, to an approach to knowing which is multiple, 
experiential and most significantly ‘performative’.  
                                                
21 For an overview of the discussion on PaR in the academy, see NELSON, R. (2006) 
Practice-as research and the Problem of Knowledge. Performance Research, 11, 105-116.
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A second aspect of Nelson’s analysis is the problem posed to knowledge by work which is, 
by nature, ephemeral, particularly performance practice. Ephemeral work not only requires 
non-traditional rules of form to be applied to its understanding, but also asks that its 
dissemination not be oriented around the paradigm of permanence which validates typical 
research submissions.  The traditional bound thesis, for example, written in clear, properly 
referenced prose, not only represents prototypically ‘objective’ knowledge through the 
language and conventions of its expression, but also embodies this objectivity in its most 
literal manifestation.  The apparent solidity and permanence of the book gives comfortable 
substance to the knowledge it contains, and might be seen to represent in physical form the 
Platonic ideal of object-like knowledge.  Knowledge expressed through practice, on the 
other hand, evades the grasp of permanence so does not fit easily on the shelf of ideal 
forms. 
Whilst blogs and other digital practices find form in bits and pixels rather than atoms and 
ink, they are not ephemeral in the way that a theatrical performance perhaps typifies.  There 
is no evidence to suggest that the text which currently resides on this or any other blog has 
a shorter lifespan than a typical book.  In fact, given the distributed and multiple nature of 
internet information management, it could be claimed that work placed online has a greater 
chance of remaining available than most works on paper.  The British Library holds copies 
of all published books, but online texts have the advantage of ubiquity, being duplicated 
endlessly across servers throughout the network.  For this reason it may not be useful to 
treat blogging as an ephemeral form and apply those elements of PaR which refer to 
ephemerality to this work.  This is not to say that other debates which mark PaR do not 
apply however;  there is clearly something of the ‘performative’ about blogging, as well as 
an approach to knowledge which does not respond well to the post-Enlightenment 
paradigm which Nelson rightly critiques.  These issues are implicitly and explicitly taken 
up in the analysis of discourse which follows.
The blog comprises a set of some 600 postings, made over a period of three years.  These 
vary in length from a few words to longer entries of several thousand.  Some posts also 
have images.  The content of these posts, whilst almost always emerging from or linking to 
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the developing themes of the research, varies in style and discursive mode; some follow the 
conventions of standard empirical objective discourse, with the use of passive voice and 
appropriate footnoting and citation, others are more ‘poetic’ or autobiographical in style, 
whilst some form part of a fictional narrative or describe workshop exercises.  This 
corresponds to the various modes of thinking and working that I found it necessary to adopt 
in exploring the ideas, and the reader is invited to take a similar praxiological journey.  
It should also be noted that the blog has produced a number of ‘outcomes’ in the form of 
full conference papers, published articles, and related artworks.   As noted above, these 
outcomes, which I am including in this submission of complementary writings as 
appendices, similarly straddle the divide between empirical and practical research, 
however, the focus of this research is not on these explicit outcomes.  The reason for this is 
that all outcomes are, in different ways, ‘objects’ and the aim here is to look at the 
circumstances which produce objectivity (and other kinds of knowledge), not at the objects 
themselves.  The focus is on the productive space within which knowledge is created, 
acquired, and communicated, and the blog is an articulation of that space.   In total, the 
postings are arrayed across an epistemological landscape stretching from the subjective 
toward these objects which the reader is invited to traverse, and it is this landscape and its 
traversal which I see as constituting the ‘practice’ of this research.  In this regard, the blog 
problematises the distinction noted above between the hard facts of positivist objectivity 
and the non-objective knowledge forms typically associated with PaR.  
Clean Language and Purple Prose
As indicated above there is a perceived relationship between the ‘rules of form’ through 
which knowledge is articulated and the value and status which is awarded to that 
knowledge.  I have discussed how this applies in relation to epistemological expressions 
made in non-standard media but ‘(c)ategories, rules of form, studies of genre and structure’ 
(Mortensen, 2004) apply most tellingly to language itself, and not only to the media utilized 
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for its conveyance.  The linguistic style in which knowledge is expressed has a bearing on 
the perceived status of that knowledge; and since, as noted above, knowledge which 
appears to have followed ‘the spirit of scientific endeavour’ acquires, in metaphorical 
terms, some of the features of an object, so the style of writing should reflect this schematic 
entailment.  This object-like appearance is predicated upon a set of techniques or ‘rules of 
form’, and these differ from the techniques used when the aim is not to create such a 
knowledge object. Furthermore, the kind of ‘metadiscourse’ used when referring to such 
styles is itself a contributor to the overall schema of knowledge within which the sense of 
our communication is formed.  
A significant distinction to which I would like to draw attention is the assumed difference 
between literal and metaphorical expression.   When the aim is to produce objective, 
empirical knowledge, particularly in the form of written or verbal language, it is a tacit 
assumption that forms of speech which rely on figurative and ‘literary’ language are 
inappropriate.  As Martin Gregory argues in a commentary in the journal Nature titled ‘The 
Infectiousness of Pompous Prose’;
There are two kinds of scientific writing: that which is intended to be read, and that 
which is intended merely to be cited.  The latter tends to be infected by an 
overblown and pompous style.  The disease is ubiquitous, but often undiagnosed, 
with the result that infection spreads to writing of the first type. (Gregory, 1992)
His extensive use of a metaphor of disease as a rhetorical device to support his argument is 
not acknowledged.
Following an article on style in scientific writing in 1996, again published in Nature, a 
number of letters appeared either supporting or disagreeing with the points made.  
Particularly pointed up was the use of the passive voice, with one respondent writing:
Using the passive voice in scientific writing allows the researcher to stand 
at a distance from his or her work. By standing at a distance, an unbiased 
viewpoint is much more likely to be reached. An unbiased viewpoint 
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encourages a world view and an open mind, surely prerequisites for good 
science.22
This phraseology, in which the quest for objectivity represented by ‘good science’ is 
understood as taking place within a clear space offering unimpeded views, is typical.  The 
largely covert metaphors of clarity, lucidity, and transparency which mark the 
metadiscourse describe the space in which the ‘spirit of scientific endeavour’ (Costopoulos, 
1999b) becomes manifest. This is expressed well in the work of Jean Baudrillard, who 
writes:
It is here that lucidity is at stake. Lucidity is precisely that which sets itself 
against this fixing of reality, this materialisation of truth, no matter what 
form it takes. In itself, it is nothing, and the only way of speaking of it 
would be that of negative theology, in the sense that it is not. It is neither a 
contract with reality nor with knowledge. It is a pact and, if it has anything 
to do with light, literally speaking, it is not with Enlightenment reason and 
objective knowledge. It would lie, to evoke a very beautiful image, at the 
intersection of the light issuing from the object and the light coming from 
the gaze. Or rather it would consist, as Musil says, in looking at the world 
with the eyes of the world – and not, as he says, in having the world at the 
distant end of the gaze [au fond du regard], because it would then crumble 
into absurd details, as sadly separated from each other as the stars at 
night… (Baudrillard, 2007: para.21)
This quotation can be seen to serve as an example of the use of language to frame certain 
forms of knowledge through a largely covert appeal to the metaphors of sense-making.  As 
intimated above, the rules of form which articulate an epistemology which leads to the 
object also legislate the means by which they are themselves rendered invisible.  The 
pursuit of a hygienically clean language style metaphorically constructs a similarly clean, 
clear, open space in which the object of knowledge might appear.  This certain style in 
writing is, therefore, one in which the metaphorical and figurative are not eradicated but in 
which they are denied.  The use of the passive voice is a part of this process, as indicated in 
the letter to Nature quoted above, in which the ‘unbiased worldview’ achieved by ‘standing 
at a distance’ corresponds to having an ‘open mind’.  
                                                
22 Simon R. Leather, Department of Biology. Imperial College, Silwood Park. Ascot.  Letter published 
in Nature 381:467 6th June1996.
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One of the aspirations accorded to this open-minded paradigm is that it represent not an 
individual, (and therefore necessarily perspectival), viewpoint but a ‘worldview’, however, 
it follows that a speaking position which suggested particularity and individual locatedness 
whilst simultaneously claiming the high ground of a totalizing vision would be a 
contradiction, one which is recognized by Thomas Nagel in The View from Nowhere who 
notes that:
One of the strongest philosophical motives is the desire for a 
comprehensive picture of objective reality, since it is easy to assume that 
that is all there really is.  But the very idea of objective reality guarantees 
that such a picture will not comprehend everything; we ourselves are the 
first obstacle to such an ambition (Nagel, 1986: 13).  
The aim within object-making language, therefore, is the discursive production of ‘lucidity’ 
through appropriate metaphorical framing, which in turn relies on an embodied metaphor 
which is primarily oriented around the visual sense.  The various entailments of the overall 
schema which are active in the discussion above are all reliant upon the experience of 
seeing, and as is developed more fully below, these are examples of one of the key 
metaphors through which knowing is understood through the association of KNOWING 
with SEEING23 (Lakoff and Johnson, 1981, Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). This metaphorical 
relationship is part of a larger set of body-based metaphors which map different types of 
knowing with different modes of sensory access; touch, smell, hearing, taste, etc. (Rouby, 
2002, Owen, 1984, Classen, 1998). The KNOWING IS SEEING metaphor is particularly 
relevant because it is through the entailments of this metaphor that many aspects of the 
structure of knowledge are articulated.  Some of these entailments support the concept of a 
particularly ‘objective’ or ‘object-like’ knowledge, and allied to this, other entailments 
narrate the relationship between the human subject and this knowledge object. It is these 
latter entailments which shape the metadiscourse, such as that above, in which we talk 
about different communication styles.
                                                
23 It is a convention within the fields of practice I am citing here to capitalize these metaphorical 
relationship.  I will be following this convention where appropriate.
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Henri Lefebvre writes of this ‘illusion of transparency’ in The Production of Space, in 
which he says,
Anything hidden or dissimulated – and hence dangerous – is antagonistic 
to transparency, under whose reign everything can be taken in by a single 
glance from that mental eye which illuminates whatever it contemplates … 
Comprehension is thus supposed, without meeting any insurmountable 
obstacles, to conduct what is perceived, i.e. its object, from the shadows to 
the light.  It is supposed to effect this displacement of the object either by 
piercing it with a ray or converting it from a murky to a luminous state 
(Lefebvre, 1991: 28).
Irit Rogoff, in an analysis of the visual culture associated with the practice of geography, 
refers to this suggestion by Lefebvre as, 
… of the utmost importance to numerous endeavors in cultural studies and 
cultural criticism.  It provides a critical apparatus for dealing with 
positivistic thought and with analyses which do not take on board issues of 
situatedness, of unmediated positionality, and which believe 
unselfconsciously both in exteriority and in the ability to define the realm 
of the ‘known’ (Rogoff, 2000: 24).
This noted significance accorded to endeavours in cultural studies and other related 
practices may be indicative of a distinction between the kind of positivistic analysis 
appropriate to scientific enquiry, and the more ‘fluid’, ‘soft knowledge’ associated with 
social facts24, and most distinctly to forms of knowing associated with arts practices25.    It 
may also be valuable to note that the visual/spatial metaphor invoked throughout these 
writings is productive of an ‘exteriority’ and the optically transparent space in which the 
hard facts of objective knowledge might appear to appear.  
Acknowledgement of the situatedness of one’s views (sic.) suggests a relativism which is 
not in accord with the desired sense of ideal objectivity.  As illustrated earlier, the 
technique used to suppress this aspect of the metaphorical schema is to avoid reference to 
such a located speaking position by either using the passive voice (‘it can be seen that …’, 
                                                
24 Durkheim, E., S. A. Solovay, et al. (1965). The rules of sociological method. [S.l.], The Free press. 
Available online at http://www.faculty.rsu.edu/~felwell/TheoryWeb/readings/DurkheimFactForm.html  
(Accessed 23/06/08)
25 These metaphorical material qualities of ‘fluidity’, and ‘hardness’, are discussed in more detail 
below.
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rather than ‘I see ….’), or to use the Royal ‘We’; replacing a singular, and therefore 
situated, viewpoint with a universalizing ‘view from nowhere’ (or everywhere).  
This notion that knowledge varies in type and that this variation might be conceptualised as 
a spatial dimension, and that the position of knowledge on that dimension entails variation 
in value, applicability, and status, is described by Nagel (1986) as follows:
Though I shall for convenience often speak of two standpoints, the 
subjective and the objective, and though the various places in which this 
opposition is found have much in common, the distinction between more 
subjective and more objective views is really a matter of degree, and it 
covers a wide spectrum. A view or form of thought is more objective than 
another if it relies less on the specifics of the individual’s makeup and 
position in the world, or on the character of the particular type of creature he 
is (Nagel, 1986: 4).
In this passage Nagel introduces a number of metaphors but the primary organization of the 
ideas depends upon entailments associated with space.  He refers to ‘standpoints’, ‘places’, 
‘views’, and ‘position in the world’, with the major (oppositional) distinction articulated 
through this spatial metaphor being one in which the ‘subjective’ is differentiated from the 
‘objective’.  In this, there is a correspondence established between subjective knowledge 
and a location in space which is proximal to the individual ‘subject’.  Objective knowledge, 
by inference, is found at a point distal to this subject and, as Marilyn Friedman, discussing 
Nagel, puts it, can only be arrived at through a process of ‘detachment’ (Friedman, 1990: 
501).  There is a sense in this of ‘stepping back’ and the breaking off of physical contact; 
further entailments of spatial metaphors.  Nagel also refers to this objectival detachment as 
‘transcendent’ and ‘transcending appearances’ (Nagel, 1986: 139), which carries a 
suggestion not only of a horizontal distancing but also of an ascendant disembodied 
panopticism.
Because of the higher (sic) status awarded to objective knowledge within Western culture it 
is inevitable that the apparent determination of objectivity through the use of metaphorical 
framing within discourse has a political dimension.   Although it is not the main aim of this 
writing to enter this area of the debate it is important to note that such a dimension exists.  
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This process by which claims for objectivity are advanced through a strategic deployment 
of  totalizing visual metaphors which deny ‘viewpoint’ whilst simultaneously adopting an 
omnipresent viewing position, has been widely critiqued, particularly within feminist 
theory (duBois, 1988, Braidotti, 1994).  Donna Haraway (1997) refers to this slight of hand 
through which a visual metaphor is transformed into a claim for omniscience as ‘the God 
Trick’26 simultaneously implying not only a panoptical objectivity but also the lofty, 
elevated, and authoritative position from which such a viewpoint might be gained; in this 
she seems to be following Nagel’s observation regarding such claims to objectivity.  In the 
book The View from Nowhere he writes on the development of a visually-based ‘detached’, 
viewpoint, associating this with Descartes who ‘tried to recapture knowledge by imagining 
his relation to the world from the point of view of God’ (Nagel, 1986: 129).
Although I do not intend to pursue these critiques within this writing, it is significant to 
note that in most cases the critique of objectivity, whilst recognizing the power of visual 
metaphor in the organizing of epistemology, is largely mounted through the deployment of 
the same metaphor structure, evidenced by the use of terms such as ‘situatedness’27.  A 
notable development of this critique is the ‘ecriture feminine’ of Helene Cixous (1981), 
Julia Kristeva (1984), and others in which an epistemology of vision is complemented by 
one which acknowledges touch, and the distant, autonomous object of scopic knowledge is 
joined by the up-close and personal knowing of the haptic28 and the visceral.  As Kelly 
Oliver (2000) describes it, this form of writing is;
… primarily tactile, bodily, and interior in the extreme… ecriture 
feminine is hard to follow because it is not linear but begins from all sides 
at once – allowing for a new departure in history; wandering through the 
                                                
26 A variant on this claim for a universal viewing position as legitimizing authority over knowledge is 
presented by Foucault in ‘Discipline and Punish’.  In his analysis authoritative power asserts itself directly not 
by simulating omniscience but through the elevation of a singular ‘viewpoint’ to a position of  panoptical 
disciplinary control. 
FOUCAULT, M. & SHERIDAN, A. (1977) Discipline and punish: the birth of the prison, London, Allen 
Lane.
27 George Lakoff refers to this process as ‘accepting the frame’, by which he means that any attempt to 
argue a point which is framed metaphorically (as most are) usually requires that parties to that debate use the 
same set of metaphors.  This means that those who determine the metaphorical ‘frame’ of the argument are at 
a distinct advantage. LAKOFF, G. (2004). Don't Think of an Elephant: Know Your Values and Frame the 
Debate--The Essential Guide for Progressives, Chelsea Green Publishing Company. 
28 This concept of the haptic, in which knowing is narrated using metaphors of the hand rather than the 
eye, is opened out in more detail below.  
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unknown elsewhere, across detachment and boundaries, crossing 
categories, and opening onto a certain laughter’. (Oliver, 2000: 256)
The overt use of metaphors in the passage above, and their exuberant mixing and 
confusion29, is typical of ecriture feminine itself.  The rejection of a scopic epistemology 
centered on the distanced, disembodied object also necessitates an abandonment of the 
rules of form which prescribe the simulation of a ‘clear space’ within which the object 
seems to appear.  In its use of figurative language such writing may read as ‘poetic’ but this 
effect is a measure of the extent to which the equally poetic writing of scopic objectivity is 
unconscious and hegemonic.
An interesting and salient variant on this metaphor is found in some of the writings of 
Pierre Bourdieu, who makes the observation that this exteriorised, visually-constructed 
sense of objectivity is claimed by power elites through a kind of synaesthetic 
transformation30.  As Loic Wacquant, summarising Bourdieu’s thinking, puts it, 
…to impose one’s art of living is to impose at the same time principles of 
vision of the world that legitimize inequality by making the divisions of 
social space appear rooted in the inclinations of individuals rather than the 
underlying distribution of capital (Wacquant, in Stones, 2008: 11).
The correlation between certain forms of ‘knowing’ and the gustatory (and olfactory) 
senses is outlined in Constance Classen (1998), who points out that the English words 
‘sagacious’ and ‘sage’, both referring to intelligence, are based on Latin words meaning to 
have a good sense of smell.  Similarly the word ‘sapient’, meaning wise, is based on the 
Latin word for taste; hence the term Homo sapiens means ‘tasting man’ as well as 
‘knowing man’. (The sense of smell is outside the terms of this writing, although it is 
extensively covered within the literature on conceptual metaphor and in more general 
                                                
29 This use of the term ‘confusion’ is ideally read in its original etymological sense from confundere, 
signifying the act of being ‘poured together’.
30 Although beyond the range of this writing, some work has been done on the switching of sensory 
modes used within metaphor, which seems to show that such ‘synaesthetic’ transformation of concepts is 
systematically ordered.  See; 
SHEN, Y. & COHEN, M. (1998) How come silence is sweet but sweetness is not silent: a cognitive account 
of directionality in poetic synaesthesia. Language and Literature, 7, 123-140, 
DAY, S. (July 1996) Synaesthesia and Synaesthetic Metaphors. PSYCHE, 2.  
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terms; (Brennan, 2004; Chu and Downes, 2000; Drobnick, 2006; Eno, 1992; Howes, 2005;
Rouby, 2002).
In Bourdieu, this exterior, conceptually public space undergoes a sensory sleight-of-hand 
through which access to knowledge-making is removed from the empirical interpersonal 
sphere of visual exteriority and placed inside the body of certain individuals, the arbiters of 
‘taste’.  The largely covert mobilisation of the taste metaphor within an epistemology 
which is structured visually, allows those with vested interests in controlling these 
epistemological processes to claim exclusivity and centrality.  The logic of taste is that it is 
individual, interior, and inaccessible, and the mixing of metaphors which uses this concept 
of taste whilst simultaneously maintaining a visually panoptic, omniscient position gives 
such claims the appearance of lucid objectivity.  An entailment of this strange mixing of 
eye and tongue in the economy of Capital knowledge is that other members of a society are 
unable to make a claim for this global gustatory gnosis.  Located eccentrically or 
peripherally within social space, the possessors of these other unaccountable ‘tastes’ are not 
in a position to claim the principles of higher vision owned by the (aesthetic) elite.
Taste is a practical mastery of distributions which makes it possible to 
sense or intuit what is likely (or unlikely) to befall — and therefore to befit 
— an individual occupying a given position in social space. It functions as 
a sort of social orientation, a ‘sense of one’s place’. (Bourdieu, 1984: 466)
The various entailments mentioned above which give structure to the otherwise abstract 
concept of knowing are mapped consistently or strategically from their metaphorical source 
within the embodied experience of seeing. The circumstances and conditions in which 
seeing takes place, the clarity of the air for example, are carried over into the schema such 
that the clarity required for effective seeing becomes part of the discourse around (this 
understanding of) effective knowing.  
Mark Johnson claims that ‘Meaning and thought emerge from our capacities for perception, 
object manipulation, and bodily movement’ (2007: 113), from the discussion above it can 
be inferred that the capacities to which he refers are always utilised within an environment.  
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This embedded nature of the embodiment which is the source of metaphors and schema 
also contributes to the organised emergence of meaning and thought, including 
epistemology.  What seems to emerge from the above consideration of ‘clear language’ is 
that this concept is understood through the application of metadiscursive metaphors which 
present the conceptual environment in which objects might be manipulated as ideally 
possessing ‘clarity’.  This indicates, as noted in the preceding paragraph, a particular 
emphasising of the visual in the construction of an embodied epistemology.
Some of the critiques of ‘objective’ language and the use of visual and spatial metaphors 
have been applied to digital practice in general and blogging in particular.  Michele Knobel 
and Colin Lankshear, writing about the development of academic blogging as a research 
and dissemination practice make the following assertion;
… we need to expand our definition of a literacy event to include 
surrounding contextual factors and also to acknowledge the fact that the 
“situatedness” of a specific event is more complex online.  Furthermore the 
notion of “event” seems to suggest that it is temporally bounded – clearly 
this does not apply in the same way to a blog. (Knobel and Lankshear, 2007: 
171)  
The placing of the word ‘situatedness’ in scare quotes partly draws attention to its non-
literal nature, but also refers the reader to a set of ideas which similarly draw upon the idea 
that knowledge might not be objectively ‘global’, but rather might be situated in an 
imaginary location, representing the view from that location, and yet still have value; this 
concept of ‘situated knowledge’ was discussed above.  It should be noticed, though, that the 
paragraph is also replete with less obvious spatial metaphors; expand, include, 
surrounding; all of which contribute toward the reader’s comprehension whilst covertly 
(and unavoidably) supplying a rich metaphorical framework to the understanding.  This 
functioning of the metaphorical sense-making process within the discourse around online 
practice is (again self-referentially) discussed by Gunther Kress who, according to Knobel 
and Lankshear,
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… approaches an analysis of online practice from a socio-semiotic 
perspective, pointing out the significant differences between screen-based 
and page-based modes of communication.  He identifies the multimedia 
capabilities of online display and the different affordances of the screen as 
supplying distinct experiences which favour the visual (rather than the 
alphabetical), and these variations, he maintains, effectively extend digital 
literacy into areas where multiple discourse communities operate.  To this 
extent, he claims, ‘new digital technologies invoke new ways of meaning-
making, and these challenge the authority of the book and the printed page 
as dominant sites for representation’ (Kress 2003, in Knobel and Lankshear, 
2007: 171).
Again, this passage begins by articulating a relatively transparent space of thought for us to 
enter; one in which particular ‘perspectives’ might be recognized that, like perspectives in 
the visual space of lived experience, are determined by the ‘situation’ we occupy.  Standing 
alongside the author in this metaphorically situated location, objects of significance might 
then be pointed out to us.  The spatial metaphor then undergoes something of a mutation, in 
which the subject under discussion, ‘digital literacy’, is said to ‘extend into areas where 
multiple discourse communities operate’.  There is a feeling that the hovering omniscient 
eye of the text, from which vantage point a variety of ‘situations’ are initially visible, has 
caught sight of a space in which its visual acuity is dysfunctional.  A space in which the 
lingua franca is less to do with display and more to do with exchange.  The space of 
‘discourse communities’, despite its favoured visuality, Kress seems to suggest, is not 
primarily visual in conceptual meaning-making.  Kress’s introduction of the concept of 
‘affordance’, a term associated primarily with J.J.Gibson (Gibson and Carmichael, 1968), 
suggests an engagement with knowledge based less on the visual ‘scopic’ sense, and more 
on the ‘haptic’ processes of touch and the felt sense. As Torill Mortensen phrases it in the 
‘Into the Blogosphere’ blog,
… the sensual element of blogging is beyond the tools of the pure gaze, and 
cannot be broken down into standardized categories or organized according 
to strict formal rules. These belong to the barbarians, and can only be 
studied by understanding and accepting involvement as a quality of the 
methodology and not a problem for the analyst.  (Mortensen, 2004). 
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These processes allude to an understanding of blogging as not only not embodying the 
spirit of scientific endeavour but as avoiding the elevated spiritual ascension of any kind of 
totalizing panoptical situation.  To be stationary in any kind of position, even the 
convergent position ocularly occupied by the tricky eye of God, is to miss the point. 
The purpleness of some of the prose associated with certain discursive forms and the 
variation in tone typical of blogging, may, therefore, not always be an indicator of a lack of 
clarity in thinking, but may constitute the surfacing of the colourful and figurative nature of 
all thinking.  The concept of the empirically ‘known’ is partially conceptualised through the 
deployment of a metaphor involving this manipulation of imaginary objects, and as 
representative of the goal aspired to by the spirit of scientific endeavour, the object gleams 
in the luminous light permeating the illusory transparent space in which this manipulation 
takes place.  Endeavours which are motivated by a different spirit, however, may have to 
shun the light and feel the pressings of other knowing.
Knowing and Seeing 
As indicated above I am referring throughout this document to a metaphor which 
understands knowing in terms of seeing, and the above discussion begins to surface this 
relationship.  Since this idea is drawn upon extensively below as part of an analysis of 
different epistemological systems, it is helpful to foreshadow some of that discussion with a 
partial description of the environment in which knowledge and knowing are arranged, 
extrapolating from the conditions which seem to be metaphorically constructed in the 
examples above to convey and privilege ‘clarity’ as a means of achieving ‘objectivity’. 
Some of the ideal conditions for seeing are therefore the conditions under which, in the 
embodied physical world, the objects around us might best be observed in their most 
sovereign state, since it is likely to be these conditions which map across as entailments of 
the metaphor within the overall schema.
First, for seeing to take place there must be a space for the ‘seer’ and the ‘seen’ to occupy. 
Secondly, this space in which both seer and seen are present must be sufficiently 
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illuminated for seeing to take place. Thirdly, the space between the seer and the seen must 
be empty and without obstruction, and should also be neither so great that the object 
disappears into the distance (or over the horizon), nor so near that it cannot be focused 
upon, or presses against the body in an uncomfortable way. Fourthly, there should be no 
disturbance in the air between seer and seen, and that air should be free from vapours, fogs, 
shadows, distracting aerial effects, or in fact anything which might draw the attention of the 
eye away from the seen object. The air should be colourless, still, and to all intents and 
purposes, absent; it should approximate the condition of pure space, a perfect conduit for 
the gaze. These are the conditions one would wish to find at the summit of a mountain, and 
which might cause one to say “I can see our house from here”. This is the state of 
interstellar space, where the blackness of the sky is testament to its ability to allow the 
unimpeded transmission of the light. Crystalline moons with unambiguous, razor-sharp 
edges. Under such conditions objects achieve their greatest clarity and the features which 
define them as objects become most available.
If these are the conditions under which the sense of sight produces the most perfect 
representation of distant objects, clearly outlined and uniquely visible, then it is likely to be 
the case that these same conditions are taken over as entailments when we wish to produce 
similarly perfect representations of metaphorical objects. When the intention is to convey 
the impression that an article of knowledge is objective we should find an aspiration to such 
conditions within the language used to make such knowledge claims. It should also be the 
case that overt reference to these conditions is made when these linguistic aspirations are 
spoken. So, for example, we might try to make our communication ‘clear’ or ‘lucid’, and 
also be able to say that that is what we are attempting. We might want to make our points 
(the directions in which we are pointing) as obvious and direct as possible. We would 
certainly avoid filling the vacuum of this space with conceptual fogs, or put up any 
obstacles to understanding. We like the space of objectivity to be colourless, so we would 
avoid purple prose, or the occluding shadows of the occult. 
Again, it is likely that we would be completely overt in our stating of these aspirations and 
take pride in our desire to avoid obscurantism through such ‘plain speaking’. These are the 
kinds of criteria for objective communication that we would cite in any metalinguistic 
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discourse about how we talk about knowledge. The reason for this seem clear (sic); in order 
to simulate in language the conditions in which objects optimally appear, we have to 
reproduce these conditions in the form of conceptual metaphors, effectively creating the 
conditions through which our knowledge can appear lucidly as object. When we say ‘speak 
clearly’ we really mean ‘simulate with your speech the emptiness of the space around the 
moon on a cloudless night in Winter, when the frost has taken all of the moisture from the 
air.’31
A question arises, however, as to how such an airless space of language might be produced; 
what are the mechanisms by which this evacuation of atmosphere and blowing away of 
conceptual fog might be effected. Although a full retelling of this story of banishment and 
cleansing is beyond the range of this writing, the recent history of how the word ‘metaphor’ 
has extended its reach affords clues.
To return to the distinction between the literal and the metaphorical introduced earlier, 
according to ideas located within such fields as embodied cognition and cognitive 
linguistics, its lack of validity has been demonstrated.  All expressions of any complexity 
involve the extensive use of metaphors and schema, because such usage is at the core of 
human cognition and conceptualization.  The apparent differences between language which 
appears figurative and that which appears ‘clear’ derive from the fact that most metaphor 
usage is covert and non-conscious.  Furthermore, this covert use extends to the discussion 
about such expressions; the idea that language can be ‘clear’, ‘clean’, ‘lucid’, or 
‘transparent’ is a further use of metaphor used to organise and frame the metadiscourse.
The explanatory power of the theoretical framework provided by embodied cognition and 
cognitive linguistics is demonstrated by the range of cultural practices to which it has been 
applied.  The following introductory text from a recent reader on this subject gives some 
indication of this:
                                                
31 A style of communication in which such metaphor construction is minimized does exist within 
certain counseling practices.  The ‘Clean Language’ technique of David Grove, developed by Lawley and 
Tompkins is a good example of this.  This practice does not remove metaphor from discourse entirely 
however, it is rather a technique through which the counselor allows the client to control the introduction and 
use of these metaphors, with a subsequent analysis of the client’s choice of metaphor forming a key element 
of the counseling process. See Lawley, J. and P. Tompkins (2000). 
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(These) essays adapt and amplify embodied cognition in such different 
fields as art history, literature, history of science, religious studies,
philosophy, biology, and cognitive science. The topics include the 
biological genesis of teleology, the dependence of meaning in signs upon 
biological embodiment, the notion of image schema and the concept of 
force in cognitive semantics, pictorial self-portraiture as a means to study 
self-perception, the difference between reading aloud and silent reading as 
a way to make sense of literary texts, intermodal (kinesthetic) 
understanding of art, psychosomatic medicine, laughter as a medical and 
ethical phenomenon, the valuation of laughter and the body in religion, 
and how embodied cognition revives and extends earlier attempts to 
develop a philosophical anthropology.  (Krois, 2007: xi)
As Stephen Pinker describes it in the title of one of his books on the subject, this 
understanding treats language as ‘a window into human nature’(2007).  There are two 
possible implications for this analysis of the way language supports the construction of 
knowledge through conceptual metaphor. Firstly, there is the slightly vertiginous loss of 
certainty which inevitably accompanies the realisation that things were not as they seemed 
and that the prized goal of objectivity is sometimes made rather than found. This is 
particularly salient in this case since, not only has everything that was solid melted into air 
but the clean, clear air itself has been sucked out along with the space which contained it32.  
Within the overall context of conceptual metaphor theory and embodied cognition however, 
nothing has really changed. This is not the landscape of endlessly deferred meaning one 
finds within poststructuralism, nor the ‘nothing to scrute’ of W.V.O. Quine for example 
who wrote that ‘The thesis of the inscrutability of reference tells us that it makes no sense 
to say absolutely, i.e., in any language or framework-independent sense, what objects a 
speaker is talking about’ (Quine, 1969: 58). Within the terms of embodied cognition, the 
observation that most language, and indeed most thought, is metaphorical does not banish 
the world, but rather casts the body and the sense-making processes inherent in that body as 
the interface between thought and world.  Cognitive operations such as the deployment of 
conceptual metaphor becomes one of what Andy Clark calls ‘(T)he slippery strategies of 
the embodied, embedded mind.’ (1997: 207).   Language is therefore configured as a part of 
that interface.
                                                
32 Which irresistably reminds me of the scene in the film ‘Yellow Submarine’ when the Beatles are 
sailing through the Sea of Holes and Ringo reaches out and grabs one of these holes, a black circle of empty 
space, plucking it from its setting and putting it in his pocket. What was left behind after the removal of the 
hole doesn’t bear thinking about.
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Again and again we use words to focus, clarify, transform, offload, and 
control our own thinkings.  Thus understood, language is not the mere 
imperfect mirror of our intuitive knowledge.  Rather it is part and parcel of 
the mechanism of reason itself (Clark, 1997: 207).
Objects remain objects and metaphorical objectivity becomes one of a number of 
imaginative poetic devices for the active comprehension of the otherwise 
incomprehensible, including the often counter-intuitive but verifiable knowledge objects 
found at the end of scientific procedures.  Without diminishing the status and particular 
value of such procedures, it might be said that the shared facts of empirical science, in the 
terms of this analysis, appear as shimmering stanzas of interpersonal poetry; the ultimate 
acts of collaborative art.  As Richard Dawkins puts it ‘Science is the poetry of reality’ 
(Dawkins, 2007).
The second implication for this embodied embedded view of the relationship between 
language and knowledge, and how cognition relates to both, is that there may be occasions 
when the knowledge figuring in the communication is not usefully considered to be a 
prototypical object lying at the end of some explicatory procedure. If this were the case 
then setting up linguistic conditions, and by implication cognitive conceptual conditions, 
which simulate the condition of objectivity may be counter-productive, reminiscent of 
Michael Polanyi’s example: ‘Suppose a lecturer points his finger at an object, and tells the 
audience: ‘Look at this!’ The audience will follow the pointing finger and look at the 
object’ (1969: 181).  If the point was not where he was pointing or the aim where it was 
aimed, this constitutes a misdirection. It may be that a better strategy is to accept the 
inevitable power of language, and the embodied cognition it evidences, to constitute not 
only ontology but also epistemology. 
Since the use of spatial metaphor appears to be ubiquitous if anything is to be said at all, the 
space of writing which does not confine itself to the necessary constructions of empiricism 
will have features and variations which are similarly unconstrained.  This space was well 
described by Michel Foucault, tracing its origins to some of the sources from which this 
writing also springs. 
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Bachelard’s monumental work and the descriptions of phenomenologists 
have taught us that we do not live in a homogeneous and empty space, but 
on the contrary in a space thoroughly imbued with quantities and perhaps 
thoroughly fantasmatic as well.  The space of our primary perception, the 
space of our dreams and that of our passions hold within themselves 
qualities that seem intrinsic: these is a light, ethereal, transparent space, or 
again a dark, rough, encumbered space; a space from above, of summits, 
or on the contrary a space from below, of mud; or again a space that can 
be flowing like sparkling water, or a space that is fixed, congealed, like 
stone or crystal (Foucault, 1986: 23).
So to this extent the writing I am undertaking here, and also in the blog which this essay 
accompanies, only partially engages with the production of objects and only partly offers 
lucidity. I hope that the conceptual space that I am opening out in order to share it with the 
reader is clean enough to allow us to both enjoy the ‘interpersonal poetry’ and 
‘collaborative art’ shaped by the agreed discourse of homo academicus33. I also hope, 
however, that the more slippery rules of form which characterise blogging, and indeed 
which may characterise (arts) practice more generally, offer different spaces in which ideas 
can play.
Knowledge (noun)
On the subject of language, the distinction that is implied in the choice of the term 
‘knowledge’ or ‘knowing’ in which there is a shift from noun to present participle is also an 
indicator of exactly how the discourse around epistemology is being framed.   
As indicated above, the organisational logic for our understanding of different forms of 
knowledge is drawn from our embodied experience as spatially-located entities, and the 
differences in knowledge types is mapped from the differences in spatial and sensory 
awareness produced by that embodiment. The use of these terms ‘knowledge’ and 
‘knowing’ can be identified with reference to this organisational schema.
                                                
33
BOURDIEU, P. (1988) Homo academicus, Cambridge, Polity Press in association with Basil Blackwell.
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When we use the word ‘knowledge’ we are implicitly conferring upon the ‘object’ of 
knowledge some of the properties associated with objects in the physical world of our 
embodiment, or conversely, we are using the experience of the ‘object’ as an image schema 
through which the abstract concept of knowledge might be understood.  This idea of the 
object as image schema is developed in Ronald Langacker (1987) and Naomi Quinn 
(1991); research which has been collected in Francisco Santibanez essay The Object Image 
Schema and Other Dependent Schemas (2002).  In this last work, Santibanez lists what he 
argues are the features of the ‘prototypical’ object
a) We can move and manipulate objects in different ways, which may modify their 
properties as well as their relations with other entities.
b) Objects are typically perceived as unified wholes which, on closer
inspection, may be mentally divided into parts in order to reason about their 
physical arrangement and functionality.
c) … loss of integrity may result in the destruction of the object.
Paul Stockwell, in ‘Cognitive Poetics’(2002) gives a slightly different description of some 
of the features of ‘objects’34; in which objects tend to be clearly bounded, be (visually) 
available to more than one individual at once, to persist over time and to continue to exist in 
absence of a viewer. 
This last feature has particular salience since, as a defining feature, it marks the object as 
distinct from the observer in a fundamental way35.  This intuitive separation between the 
observer and the observed, which serves to determine the ontological sovereignty of the 
object and therefore the similarly sovereign state of objectivity, has been critiqued by a 
number of writers, even whilst the apparent naturalness of such a separation is 
acknowledged (see Bloom, 2004).  This critique also appears in the philosophy of science. 
As the physicist Percy Bridgman, put it:
                                                
34 In presenting this list, Stockwell is drawing largely on a Gestalt tradition in which objects or figures 
are distinguished from the ‘ground’ against which they are placed.  
35 As the science fiction author Philip K. Dick put it “Reality is that which, when you stop believing in 
it, doesn't go away”.  http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Philip_K._Dick  (Accessed 19/06/08)
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Since an object never occurs naked but always in conjunction with an 
instrument of measurement or the means whereby we obtain knowledge of 
it, the concept of ‘object’ as something in and of itself, is an illegitimate 
one. (Bridgeman in Hook, 1974: 48)  
This is also a question which exercised Albert Einstein  (in Schilpp, 1959), particularly in 
relation to the status of the moon as an ontological/epistemological object of realist 
knowledge.  Despite these reservations, however, the condition of the prototypical object 
described by Stockwell still seems to figure within the logic of the language game of 
empiricism, and forms the object at the end of the panoptical gaze discussed earlier.  This 
use of the term ‘knowledge’ places our attention on the apparently autonomous object, and 
distracts us from the presence of the instrument of our own processes of knowledge 
production. The body is rendered ‘absent’ and ‘ecstatic’ (Leder, 1990: 20)  in this flight 
away from the source of such ‘measurement’ toward its destination in the 
perceived/conceived, and theoretically ‘possessed’ object. 
Knowing (verb)
The term ‘knowing’ has a very different function within the overall schema, and it is 
revealing that certain writers, Mark Johnson  (2007) for example, makes explicit and 
insistent use of ‘knowing’ as a preferential term. Knowing, as a verb, demands the 
acknowledgement of a subject engaged in the act indicated; there is no escape or flight 
from the body of the knower as seems to be implied by ‘knowledge’. In using the term 
‘knowing’ the focus is shifted away from the destination of the knowledge production 
process and widened to include something of the source and the path. There is also a sense, 
in this use of the verb, that the object of such knowing is not complete and permanent, 
existing like a rock on the riverbed, but rather is open to the pressings of engagement. 
In order to flesh out these sentences, with their shape-shifting references to objects, 
subjects, acts of knowing and scripts of knowledge, it might be useful to return to the 
original binary of objectivity and subjectivity.  These are the compass directions on a map 
of knowing which is shared by each of the examples opened up in the examples below and 
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which point to the two locations that mark the limits of a horizontal epistemological 
dimension; inwards to the core of the self, seat of understanding, fount of wisdom, and 
viewpoint on the tacit; and outwards to the experimetrical horizon of data, the unrolling 
procedural path to the possessible object. 
Embodied Cognition and Conceptual Metaphor
In this section of the writing I unpack some of the background to embodied cognition as it 
has informed the relationships between body, language, and environment.  I introduce 
conceptual metaphor and image schemas as analytic frameworks for approaching the thesis, 
and begin to indicate some of the main areas of exploration that this framework will be 
brought to.
Whilst modern theories of embodied cognition, including the use of conceptual metaphor 
and image schema, are grounded in evolutionary psychology, linguistics, and neuroscience, 
their philosophical roots are elsewhere.  Johnson, for example, who has written several 
seminal texts which have helped to define this field, (both sole authored and in 
collaboration with George Lakoff), places these ideas in a lineage coming out of the 
American Pragmatism of William James and John Dewey, and into the phenomenology of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Eugene Gendlin, and Drew Leder among others. Although 
Johnson does not mention Gaston Bachelard, I would also place him within this trajectory, 
to the extent that his aim in, for example, The Poetics of Space (1994) is to uncover the 
embodied, sensate, and indeed sensual relationship between the poetic imagination and 
lived experience.  
In proceeding with this analysis, it may be relevant to note that suggestions of universality 
have been made regarding some of the ideas in the writing (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, 
Lakoff, 1990), basing this universality on common human experience, common 
embodiment, and common evolutionary history. Although I find many of these 
propositions compelling, this is not a claim that will be advanced here.  I am referring 
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primarily to the epistemological discourse of the Western philosophical tradition; primarily 
that line of thought which, as noted above, arises out of American Pragmatism, 
phenomenology, and the experiential philosophy that is informed by developments within 
embodied cognition and cognitive linguistics.  This is the tradition that is critiqued and 
reinterpreted in Lakoff and Johnson’s ‘Philosophy in the Flesh’ (1999) and which is a key 
resource within this analysis.
Until relatively recently an understanding of the relationships between language and the 
world involved an unproblematic division between the literal and the metaphorical, (see 
Ortony, 1979).  Developments in embodied cognition, grounded ultimately in evolutionary 
psychology, have demonstrated that our ability to conceptualise abstract concepts, 
including the concept of knowledge, requires the extensive, and largely unconscious, use of 
metaphor and related figurative devices. Moreover, the notion of metaphor as primarily a 
linguistic phenomenon is replaced with an understanding that considers it as present in all 
forms of expression; signs, gestures, behaviour etc.  
The biologist and linguistic Stephen Pinker traces the origins of metaphor use to an 
adaptation of existing cognitive mechanisms originally designed to allow the body to sense 
and negotiate its environment. As Pinker describes it, the structures of cognition which in 
early humans, as in other animals, originally evolved to deal with the problems of moving 
through a physical spatial environment; sensing objects and movements, experiencing force 
and resistance, at some point were copied into other parts of the brain such that they 
became ‘scaffolding whose slots are filled with symbols for more abstract concerns like 
states, possessions, ideas, and desires’ (Pinker, 1997: 355).
Lakoff and Johnson identify a second mechanism by which the cognitive ‘scaffolding’ 
proposed by Pinker becomes populated with metaphorical associations.  They claim that in 
early childhood terms from the concrete ‘source’ domain of lived experience are fused with 
terms from the abstract ‘target’ domain through their repeated coincident occurrence.  So, 
for example, the experience of seeing the level of liquid in a container go up as more liquid 
is added to it leads to the association of MORE with UP (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999).
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This association then becomes available as a metaphor to express the sense that some 
otherwise abstract concept is increasing or decreasing.  Lakoff and Johnson cite expressions 
such as ‘prices rose; his income went down; unemployment is up; exports are down; the 
number of homeless people is very high’ to demonstrate this process.36  Working with the 
same metaphor, Zoltan Kovecses  (2001: 214) cites the example of sound intensity which is 
often identified as being ‘high’ in volume, and this can be reduced by turning the sound 
‘down’.   Allied to this use of UP as a metaphor for MORE is an elaboration in which UP is
GOOD (Lakoff in Ortony, 1979: 240); although this entailment is not developed directly 
here, it may be evident throughout some of the examples discussed below that this 
association is at work in the construction of certain ideas.
An important example of this ‘conflation’ is that which is argued as linking the concrete 
experience of seeing with the abstract concept of knowing.  This metaphorical link is 
developed by Christopher Johnson  (1999), Joseph Grady (1997), and Lakoff and Johnson  
(1981), and is claimed to be forged through the recurrent experience in which one ‘comes 
to see’ (something) at the same time as one ‘comes to know’ (that thing).  This example of 
a metaphorical association is significant to this writing and is discussed in more detail 
below.
The conclusion of these various theories and developments is an understanding of the key 
role that metaphor plays in language and cognition. This is summed up by Lakoff and 
Johnson as follows:
Metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination and the 
rhetorical flourish – a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary 
language. Moreover, metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of 
language alone, a matter of words rather than thought or action. For this 
reason, most people think they can get along perfectly well without 
metaphor. We have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in 
everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary 
conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act is 
                                                
36 Lakoff goes on to claim that this association between the conflated terms of the metaphor has a 
cultural universality based on the commonality of certain human experiences.  As I state above, whilst this 
claim for universality is compelling I am not advancing that claim in this thesis.
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fundamentally metaphorical in nature…. But our conceptual system is not 
something we are normally aware of. (Lakoff and Johnson, 1981: 6) 
Lakoff and Johnson go on to make a robust claim that metaphor, rather than simply 
providing poetic flourishes to otherwise transparent37 speech, is constitutive of major 
aspects of cognition itself, and that this cognition is revealed through language and other 
expressive forms.  This model of the relationship between embodiment, cognition, and 
language, is further supported by research in the areas of evolutionary psychology (Barkow 
et al., 1995), consciousness studies  (Barnden, 1997) neuroscience (Feldman and 
Narayanan, 2004; Rapp et al., 2004), philosophy of science (Brown, 2003; Jones, 1983), 
politics (Lakoff, 2002, 2004), studies of gesture, (McNeill, 1992; Kendon, 1997; Kendon, 
2004), and education (Lee and Timothy, 2003; Wilson, 1995).  To date no extensive work 
has been carried out which applies the theoretical frameworks provided by embodied 
cognition and cognitive linguistics to digital media practices, including blogging and web-
based expressions.  Nor has there been any attempt to use these analytical techniques to 
uncover relationships between different forms of knowledge and knowing.  These are some 
of the areas under investigation in this thesis.
Image Schema
The term ‘image schema’ is developed particularly in the work of Mark Johnson (1992, 
1995), although it has been used and expanded by others (Stockwell, 2002, McVittie, 2007, 
Gibbs and Colston, 1995), and indicates a particular use of conceptual metaphor that is 
found in much complex cognition, and is one which I use within this writing.  An image 
schema, (or sometimes ‘kinesthetic image schema’) is a structured set of interrelated 
images and/or actions which are imported wholesale for use as a means to comprehend the 
otherwise incomprehensible. As Stockwell defines it in ‘Cognitive Poetics: An 
Introduction’;
Image schemas are mental pictures that we use as basic templates for 
                                                
37 As noted above, the very concept that speech might be ‘transparent’ is evidence of the pervasiveness 
of metaphor within discourse. 
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understanding situations that occur commonly.  We build up image 
schemas in our minds, and we tend to share particular image schemas with 
the community in which we live, on the basis of our local bodily 
interaction with the world.  (Stockwell, 2002: 16) 
Image schemas differ from conceptual metaphors in that, whereas metaphors are used to 
refer to relatively simple, static concepts, image schemas have complex dynamic structures 
which articulate relationships amongst metaphorical entities drawn from the relationships 
between their counterparts in physical experience.  This set of relations allows more 
detailed and highly structured concepts to be understood.  
The development of conceptual metaphor theory and image schemas has provided a meta-
analytic framework to consider a range of different types of writing: scientific, poetry, 
impressionistic, anecdotal, imagistic, and technical. All of these highly varied writing 
forms, and the concepts they refer to, are ultimately grounded in the common vocabulary of 
the body and the sensorimotor system. Indeed, there is no good reason why non-written 
forms might not also be embraced within the terms of the theory since pictures, actions, 
objects, etc are as susceptible to metaphor analysis as written or spoken texts.
George Lakoff in ‘Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things’ (1990) begins just such a cross-
modal analysis in his discussion of the concept of anger. Through the identification of a key 
metaphor for anger in which it is conceived of as pressure in a sealed container, (usually in 
the presence of heat), he is able to track this idea across personal narratives, cartoon 
images, fictional writings, and scientific (psychoanalytic) texts.
The common ground of poetic cognition out of which all expression exudes and of which 
metaphor is a part, regardless of its status as objective or subjective, personal or 
interpersonal, scientific or artistic, provides a space in which all of these expressive forms 
can be considered.  As such it provides a structure for the analysis of epistemologies at 
work in the blog to which this writing refers.  In The Conference Report a range of writing 
styles are utilised suggestive of these different ways of knowing, and one of the aims in the 
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following sections will be to identify the key metaphors and schema which underpin and 
connect these knowledge forms.  
Metaphors of Knowledge
As noted above, according to Lakoff and Johnson (1981) and others, the most common 
metaphor for knowing is KNOWING IS SEEING.  This metaphor is revealed in turns of 
phrase such as ‘I see what you mean’ and ‘I’m looking for a solution to this problem’.  In 
both of these phrases the visual term is substituted for what would otherwise be an abstract 
and therefore less comprehensible term.  
The following pages draw out some of the unspecified, but nevertheless implicit 
entailments of the KNOWING IS SEEING schema and relate it to the wider schema 
KNOWING IS SENSING (see Lakoff and Johnson, 1981).  Thereafter, the concrete 
scenario from which this schema and its entailments are unconsciously drawn is explained, 
marking how shifts in this scenario affect the conceptualization of knowledge in a coherent 
and structured way.  I will argue that the KNOWING IS SENSING schema is part of an 
overall large-scale schema, broadly based on the embodied experience of being in space, 
and that the variations in how this space might be conceived, in what one might expect to 
encounter in that space, in the different ways of accessing that space, and the possibilities 
of movement within that space, have salient effect on the time of KNOWING that is 
effected.  Using this overall schema I will aim to demonstrate that the differences that we 
find in knowledge types (objective/subjective, tacit/explicit, felt/propositional etc.) fall out 
from the application of this schema relating knowing to the variable experiencing of space.  
In order to demonstrate how this understanding of knowing and knowledge functions 
through the application of an image schema based on the experience of ‘being-in-space’ I 
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consider how this plays out in terms of established systems of epistemology.  I demonstrate 
that a consistency can be observed within the structure of different knowledge systems and 
that this consistency reflects the image schema noted above.  As a means to make this 
manifest I will first consider three such systems; Michael Polanyi’s Tacit and Explicit 
Knowledge, David Perkins Proactive, Performative, Possessive model, and the Data, 
Information, Knowledge, Wisdom Hierarchy associated with Ackoff, Zeleny, and others.
Michael Polanyi – The Tacit Dimension
Dorothy Leonard and Sylvia Sensiper, writing on the role of ‘tacit knowledge’ in group 
innovation make the following claim:
Knowledge exists on a spectrum. At one extreme, it is almost completely 
tacit, that is semiconscious and unconscious knowledge held in people’s 
heads and bodies. At the other end of the spectrum, knowledge is almost 
completely explicit or codified, structured and accessible to people other 
than the individuals originating it. Most knowledge of course exists 
between the extremes. Explicit elements are objective, rational and 
created in the 'then and there', while the tacit elements are subjective 
experiential and created in the 'here and now'. (1998: 113)
These terms, ‘tacit’ and ‘explicit’ come from the writings of Michael Polanyi and signify 
types of knowing which it may be informative to relate to the overall schema informing this 
essay.  In Polanyi’s terms, explicit knowledge is simply that which can be communicated in 
symbolic form and has some overlap with ‘propositional’38 or ‘declarative’ knowledge.  
Explicit knowledge is typically ‘know that’ in character and corresponds with that which 
can be written, spoken, represented diagrammatically, or articulated in the form of 
                                                
38 See 
KLEIN, P. D. (1971) A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge. The Journal of 
Philosophy, 68, 471-482. An important distinction, although one which is not relevant at 
this point in the writing, is that propositional knowledge consists of ‘that which can be 
stated as the case’, which contains the suggestion of the subjective and the personal 
perspective. It is therefore not analogous to ‘objective knowledge’.
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instructions, rules, laws, and heuristics.  Explicit knowledge, in metaphorical terms, 
approaches the condition of the object in that it can be fixed, outlined, and rendered 
permanent through its encoding into language or other form.
The concept of tacit knowledge has been extended by writers since Polanyi such that it is 
sometimes taken to include almost any form of knowledge which is simply not expressed, 
(Leonard and Sensiper, 1998, Koskinen and Vanharanta, 2002).  Polanyi’s original 
understanding of the term was more precise however.  Polanyi saw tacit knowledge as 
providing the fundamental components from which other, more explicit forms of knowing 
might proceed, and as underpinning the most apparently autonomous, conscious, and 
explicit, see Haridimos Tsoukas (1996).  Tacit knowledge may include the linguistic and 
cultural contextual information which is necessary for an article of knowledge to be 
understood, or in a more physically embodied sense, it might consist of those elements of 
perception which are unavailable to consciousness but nevertheless contribute to conscious 
observation.  In the essay ‘The Structure of Consciousness’ in Knowing and Being, (1969)  
Polanyi gives the example of our ability to see the world in three dimensions.  This ability 
is the result of our having two eyes, set a few inches apart, each capturing a slightly 
different version of the visual field.  These two images, combined with the extra 
information provided by the differences between them, are processed by the visual system 
in the brain to produce the final image which is presented to consciousness; an image 
containing the dimension of ‘depth’ that was not present in either of the originating images.  
What is significant here is that the images presented separately to the left and right eyes are 
not available to us consciously, and in fact we would have no way of bringing these images 
to consciousness (apart from closing one eye of course, which simultaneously dismisses 
this kind of depth perception).  The three dimensional image, which Polanyi referred to as 
constituting our ‘focal awareness’ cannot be decomposed back into its constituent 
‘subsidiary’ elements.   Whilst the observable scene is explicit and can be spoken of 
descriptively, the subsidiary materials from which it emerges are necessarily tacit and, 
whilst obviously ‘known’, inasmuch as they figure in the process of cognition and 
composition, necessarily remain in silence.   As Polanyi observed in The Tacit Dimension, 
‘we can know more than we can tell’, (Polanyi, 1983: 4).
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It is significant that, for Polanyi, the processes through which tacit knowledge is composed 
and utilized do not necessarily ever become available as explicit knowledge.  Rather, such 
accumulations of subsidiary sensation and experience give rise to the play of hunches, 
guesses, intuitive leaps, and gut responses which he referred to as ‘passions’.   Tacit 
knowledge is not sterile and distant, but is rather threaded throughout with emotion and 
responses close to the heart of the person.  It is this understanding which underpins and 
gives the name to Polanyi’s best known work, ‘Personal Knowledge’ (Polanyi, 1958).
Without wishing to reduce meaning to etymology, and in the spirit of the kind of metaphor 
analysis which is key within the conceptual frameworks I am utilising39, these terms, tacit
and explicit, will be considered in more detail.  This may help to open up the relationship 
between the forms of knowing they stand for and the image schema of a spatially-extended, 
sensorially-equipped being that is introduced above.  
Explicit
In some formulations the term ‘explicit’ has come to mean sexually exposed or provocative 
and, when applied to rap music for example, to mean containing uncensored and possibly 
offensive speech40.  As far as the origins of the term go, whilst they may appear to lie 
elsewhere, they do suggest a continuity which embraces these contemporary vernacular 
uses and Polanyi’s application of the word to a form of knowledge.  Explicit comes from 
the Latin explicitus which translates as ‘to unfold’ or ‘to roll out’ (Hoad, 1986), and traces 
of the plicitus can be found in the modern usage plait of hair or plywood.  As noted in the 
same source, the words explicitus est liber could often be found at the end of medieval 
                                                
39 For examples on the application of metaphor analysis within a range of academic and clinical 
contexts see http://creet.open.ac.uk/projects/metaphor-analysis/project-
introduction.cfm?subpage=bibliography  (Accessed 18/06/08)
40 The term ‘explicit’ features extensively in the regulations produced by the RIAA, the regulatory 
body in the USA overseeing the recording industry.  The so-called ‘PAL sticker’, attached to the outside of 
recordings regarded as having potentially offensive content, reads ‘Parental Advisory: Explicit Content’.  
Current RIAA guidelines are available online at http://riaa.com/parentaladvisory.php?content_selector=  
(Accessed 19/06/08)
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manuscripts where today we might find The End. The location of this sentence at the end of 
piece of writing makes literal and appropriate sense when that writing takes the form of a 
scroll, which is where one would originally find them.  In arriving at that point of the 
writing, the ‘explication’, one had literally unrolled the knowledge into the world and hence 
made it ‘explicit’.   The examples of modern usage in sexually-loaded images or 
potentially-offensive language can be seen to follow that tradition in metaphorical form.  
The pornographic picture is explicitly provocative because it does not lie dormant on the 
page, but is felt to unfurl across the space between image and viewer and seems to touch his 
passions directly.  The obscenities and violence found in the lyrics to some music may, in 
this sense, be thought of as the unfolding of an arm and the throwing of a punch out at the 
listener.     The explicit knowledge of Polanyi shows a family resemblance to these 
metaphorical instantiations, and indeed to a raft of other uses, all of which link some work 
of the intellect to an outgoing occupation of space.  
Walter Ong includes this term amongst those which he saw as relating knowing not only to 
the occupation of space, but also to vision41, ‘when knowledge is likened to sight it 
becomes pretty exclusively a matter of explanation or explication, a laying out on a surface, 
perhaps in chart-like form, or an unfolding, to present maximum exteriority’ (Ong, 1977: 
123).  There is the sense that the knowing which can be described, articulated, proposed, 
and declared, has extended itself outward from the person of the speaker, carving a clear 
path through space such that it stands as an object at the end of that path.   
The close allegiance of the notion of the explicit is thoroughly exploited in Rebecca 
Schneider’s ‘The Explicit Body in Performance’(1997).  As part of a series of closely 
argued propositions about, particularly, the status of women in relation to body-based arts 
practice she says that, in exploring Carolee Schneemann’s work, she intends to ‘unpack the 
legacies of visual perspectivalism relative to the “scene” of body made explicit in 
contemporary feminist performance’(1997: 7).  She goes on to say that:
                                                
41 The particular significance of vision is returned to below.
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Habits of perspectival vision have emblematically placed the female body 
at the vanishing point even as the primary scene or landscape of 
representation is feminized.  Taking issue with those who claim that the 
twentieth century has seen the demise of perspectival ways of seeing, I 
argue that certain tenets of pespectival vision, particular the removed, 
invisible viewer, are still very much at play even in so-called antiocular 
economies of vision.… I suggest that explicit body performers employ 
second sight/site, a doubled vision, as the “look back” at visual 
perspective. (1997: 7)
I would not wish to unpack this paragraph in its entirety in terms of the various conceptual 
metaphors of space that it draws upon and which allow it to make sense; some of these are, 
indeed, addressed later in this writing.  What we might note at this point is that the term 
explicit is clearly being adopted because of its implication of an unfolding across (possibly 
contested) space.  This application of the schema is used by Schneider along with a set of 
understandings concerning the politics of space, gaze, and objects.
Tacit
The other term in Polanyi’s apparent binary is, as already noted, ‘tacit’, and is familiar from 
its derivative, ‘taciturn’.  (‘Apparent’ because they are neither complementary nor opposite, 
as Polanyi himself indicates they are terms which describe the structure of a ‘dimension’, 
not separate and isolated alternatives ). Both words have in common their origins in silence, 
and in that which is passed over in silence.  The difference that makes a difference is that, 
whilst taciturn suggests a reluctance or unwillingness to speak, tacit does not offer even the 
possibility.  In this sense the tacit is reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s ‘what can be said at all 
can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence’  (1961: 
151) .  Paralleling the physical principle of ‘subsidiary awareness’ outlined above, to be 
tacit is to be constitutive of expressibility but to take no part in that expression.  Though it 
has position within the body of the speaker, that position is disposition.   In contrast to 
explicit knowledge which folds out in the direction of a metaphorically external, distant 
object, tacit knowledge stays close to home and the condition of the subject.  In the 
spectrum of knowing and being, tacit knowledge blends into being.
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The overall image that Polanyi provides is therefore supportive of the overall image schema 
that we are here articulating; an understanding of knowledge and knowing which maps onto 
our experience of being at the centre of phenomenal space.  That which is close to us, or 
which is interior to us, does not extend into space and cannot be visualized and objectified.  
It is held in the necessary silence of our being.  Beyond the limits of our skin and the limits 
of our arms the act of knowing rolls out toward the horizon, leading our eyes to the object 
created by that unfolding.  
Other Knowledge Binaries
Like the distinction that Polanyi makes between tacit and explicit knowledge, many 
taxonomies of knowledge rely on an apparent binary division which separates what are 
seen as two prototypically different forms of knowing.  A list of such pairings, particularly 
as they are applied to mathematics, is provided by Lenni Haapsalo and Dorde Kadijevic;
• conceptual vs. practical knowledge
• manifest (structural) vs. instrumental content
• knowing that - knowing how
• declarative vs. procedural knowledge
• facts/propositional vs. skills/procedural knowledge 
• hierarchies of cognitive units - condition-action rules
• relational representations - condition-action rules
• understanding - algorithmic performance
• conceptual competence - procedural competence
• rich vs. poor in relationships/algorithms
• theological vs. schematic knowledge
• deductive vs. empirical knowledge
• meaningful vs. mechanical knowledge
• logical/relational vs. instrumental understanding
• connected networks - sequences of actions
• connections between conceptions - computational skills
• words specifying concept - mental images/processes 
• definitions/connections - rules/connotations 
• proceptual vs. procedural thinking 
• structural vs. operational thinking
(2000: 141).
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This plethora of epistemological systems which divide forms of knowing into opposing 
binaries might suggest that the terms on each side of this distinction are necessarily 
synonymous, however, there are, in fact, subtle differences between these adjacent 
concepts.  It would be beyond the scope of this essay to unpick all of the possible 
distinctions in detail, however, an analysis of the difference between two terms which are 
occasionally merged, that is the difference between Polanyi’s tacit and the procedural 
knowledge which features in some of the pairings above, may be useful. The identification 
of what distinguishes these terms from each other brings out certain subtleties in the 
working of the overall image schema for which I am arguing.
Tacit vs. Procedural Knowledge
The term procedural knowledge, articulated most clearly by Gilbert Ryle (1949) as ‘know 
how’ (as opposed to ‘know that’) is often contrasted most directly with descriptive, 
declarative, or propositional knowledge.  Generally, but not exclusively, applied to physical 
knowing such as sport or craft-based activities, procedural knowledge takes the form of a 
set of learned actions and physical schema which allow for complex tasks to be undertaken.  
The acquisition of procedural knowledge might prototypically involve such strategies as 
apprenticeship, ‘on the job’ training, rehearsal, ‘trial and error’ learning, or some kind of 
guided ‘learning by doing’.  Typical examples might include learning to drive, 
choreography or dance technique classes, or teaching oneself to juggle.  The common 
feature of these activities is that they have a common metaphorical structure which is, in 
turn, drawn from an established image schema known as the SOURCE PATH GOAL 
schema  (Johnson, 1992, Lakoff and Johnson, 1981).  In this schema the acquisition of 
knowledge is seen as progress along a path, with the incremental movement along that path 
corresponding to the incremental gaining of knowledge or skill.  The ultimate aim of this 
movement, the final goal, is the desired knowledge which is conceptualised as lying at the 
end of that path, (or in some variants as comprising the path itself, or as the terminal point 
of that path).  The procedure of gaining knowledge, then, is understood through the 
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embodied metaphor of proceeding along a path to a preconceived location, with the 
attainment of the goal involving arrival at that location.  In terms of the learning of a 
physical craft or skill, the gradual progression toward expertise that typifies apprenticeship-
type training for example, is closely mapped onto this SOURCE PATH GOAL schema.  In 
fact, the match is so close that it can be quite difficult to detect the presence of a metaphor 
in operation, we routinely say of such learning that it involves ‘steps’, ‘progression’, 
‘advancing ones studies’, etc.  This unconscious application is typical of a conceptual 
metaphor in action.  
Although, as noted above, this metaphor of journeying along a path to a goal is typically 
applied to procedural knowledge in a craft-based or other ‘hands on’ activity42, it also 
informs many other common understandings of knowledge acquisition revealed in 
expressions such as ‘training course’, etc.  Again, this use of metaphor is so intuitive that it 
tends to pass below the radar of conscious awareness in a way that more overtly ‘poetic’ 
metaphor would not.
Procedural knowledge tends not to be articulated in the form of language, or to the extent 
that it is so expressed it is usually recognised that the words do not capture the knowledge 
in its entirety; learning to drive by only reading the manual is unlikely to be successful, 
(although it may be significant that such a manual exists which at least points one in the 
direction of the knowledge; see below).  In this regard procedural and tacit knowledge 
show some similarities, however, in other respects they are quite different and such 
difference seem to suggest complexities in the schema which are perhaps not immediately 
apparent.  Whereas procedural knowledge contains within the logic of its unspoken and 
unconscious metaphorical construction the idea of a path which knowledge acquisition 
must proceed along, tacit knowledge has no such trajectory.  And while the directions that 
procedural knowledge must follow to reach its final goal may be available in propositional 
form, as a manual giving instruction on the technique of driving for example, such 
propedeutic devices do not engage with the idea of the tacit at all.  As noted above, Polanyi 
                                                
42 The relationship suggested here between the haptic sense of ‘crafting’ knowledge and the movement 
through space that is implicit in ‘procedure’ is explored later in this writing.
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likens tacit knowledge to the subsidiary awareness which is constitutive of the depth of 
knowing, but which is itself unavailable to focal awareness. As a dispositional faculty, the 
tacit is embodied at the level of perception and constitutive less of knowing than of being.  
Tacit knowledge has no ultimate goal, and whilst it can be deployed in the making of maps 
and identification of goals, it does not comprise either map or goal in itself.  Therefore, just 
as tacit is not simply the opposite term of a binary to explicit (the opposite of which, 
presumably would be implicit), so it is also not understood as synonymous with procedural.  
Rather than being different terms for the same categories within a purely binary taxonomic 
index of knowledge types, these concepts, tacit and procedural, as well as many others, 
figure within a complex but substantially coherent metaphorical image schema.   
David Perkins – Beyond Understanding
In ‘Beyond Understanding’, a keynote speech at the symposium on Threshold Concepts at 
Strathclyde University, David Perkins (Perkins, 2006) laid out a taxonomy of knowledge 
and its application to teaching and learning. He describes knowledge as taking up one of 
three ontologically distinct forms. 
The first he describes as ‘possessive’ knowledge, in which the object of knowledge is felt 
capable of being owned by the individual and can be produced on request. In this the item 
of knowledge is considered as possessed by the individual and this possession is, in turn, 
conceived of as a kind of object, a rock that can be produced on demand. This metaphorical 
mapping of the concept of knowledge-as-object has the effect of awarding other object-like 
properties to the knowledge item. Objects tend to be relatively solid, clearly bounded, and 
consistent over time. Similarly, knowledge which has this character of a possessed object is 
also intuitively experienced as solid, bounded, stationary, and permanent.  (This 
understanding of knowledge-as-object is expanded in a later section of this writing.)
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The second form of knowledge that Perkins introduces is that which he considers 
‘performative’43. This type of knowing goes beyond the rote recitation of solid items of 
data and begins to use this data, these facts, not as objects of thought but as tools to think 
with. Knowledge, in this formulation, becomes less like a set of solid, separate, inert 
entities and more like living dynamic structures, capable of breeding, hybridising, 
fissioning, fusing, and blending (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002). 
. 
Performative knowledge responds to situations in a way which is not hard and resistant, but 
which is flexible and yielding, and the clearest examples of this knowledge is its ability to
respond to creative or problem-solving situations. Possessed, object-like knowledge is 
speechless when faced with problems which require more than the rote revealing of a pre-
existing solution. The individual, isolated facts which characterise a possessed knowledge 
approach do not allow the kind of analysis and creative thinking which active problem 
solving demands. Performative knowing, on the other hand, is well equipped to make an 
appropriate response. This ability of what Perkins calls performative knowledge to 
dynamically construct novel solutions to problems and creative responses to situations is 
referred to frequently in literature on creativity and innovation. Arthur Koestler (1989).  
calls it ‘bisociation’44, elsewhere it is formalised into knowledge generation systems and 
training routines such as Triz (Altshuller, 1984) Synectics  (Gordon, 1961) amongst others. 
Performative knowledge is very good at responding to set briefs, solving problems, 
fulfulling creative criteria, and producing novel answers to well-framed questions.
The third type of knowledge which Perkins introduces, and the one which adds the most to 
current understanding of knowledge, is what he terms ‘proactive’. This form of knowing, as 
the name implies, is neither inert nor reactive or responsive, but rather is actively engaged 
in the processes of its own implementation. Individuals who are able to mobilise proactive 
                                                
43 As indicated earlier, the term ‘performative’ and its etymological root ‘performance’ have been 
widely used and have shifted their meaning considerably through this usage.  
44 It is revealing to note that Koestler explains ‘bisociation’ in saying “I have coined the term 
‘bisociation’ in order to make a distinction between the routine skills of thinking on a ‘plane’ as it were, and 
the creative act which, as I shall try to show, always operates on more than one plane”. (ibid: p.135)  Even 
though Koestler draws our attention to his use of the word ‘plane’ being a figure of speech by placing it in 
scare quotes, it still passes seamlessly into our understanding through the use of this familiar embodied spatial 
metaphor.
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knowledge resources are not ‘problem solvers’ they are ‘problem finders’, that is, the 
knowledge that they embody (possess is too passive a term) seems to constantly engage 
with the world around them looking for opportunities to perform. Proactive knowledge 
does not simply appear on demand when a question is posed or a problem is set. This type 
of knowledge seems largely to be dispositional; certain attitudes or habits of behaviour 
need to be in place in order for proactivity to emerge, and whilst such disposition can be 
learned or cultivated, according to Perkins it is likely that some individuals would find this 
easier than others. Proactive knowledge users, whether by accident of nature or design of 
education, are constantly asking questions of the world, noticing small irregularities in the 
fabric of society, finding new uses for old objects, coining new words and phrases because 
they like the taste of language. They make extensive and joyful use of metaphor and 
analogy, and are incontinent inventors. 
This continuum of knowledge, from the possessive at one extreme to the most proactive at 
the other, is complementary to the continuum of objectivity and subjectivity. Possessive 
knowledge, constitutive of object-like facts, appears, unsurprisingly, at the objective end of 
the spectrum. It is experienced as distant, removed, existing in interpersonal space. 
Proactive knowledge, conversely, is felt against the surface of the body, or even inside the 
body, and is inseparable from the experience of being.  Proactive knowledge is most likely 
to be identified as a component of the personality of a person, rather than something outside 
the orbit of their identity. It is part of the subjective phenomenological experience of one's 
self concept. Between these telomeric endpoints Perkins places ‘performative’ knowledge, 
As noted above, the term ‘performative’ has an extensive history and figures in a wide 
range of discourses outside of the particular use that Perkins makes of it.  This variation in 
use has been partly mapped by Bal (2002), who identifies it as one of a number of 
‘travelling concepts’ which show this peripatetic tendency to cross disciplinary boundaries.  
Its deployment within the writing of Judith Butler (1990, 1997), has been particularly 
influential, although its origins in J.L. Austin’s seminal work ‘How to Do Things with 
Words’ (1971) is possibly closest to the sense in which Perkins is using it.  In Austin’s 
formulation a performative term is a word which carries out a particular action; ‘I swear’, 
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for example, or ‘I name this ship’.  Such performative expressions or ‘illocutionary acts’ 
are not descriptive of an entity which lies outside of the sound; rather such terms actively 
craft the nature of the environment in which they are uttered.  When the words ‘I swear’ are 
spoken it is as if the speaker has placed metaphorical hands on the surface of experience 
and moulded it into the shape of the truth that is being attesting to.  The performative 
knowledge that Perkins invokes is similarly haptic in nature, taking hold of ideas and 
kneading them into new and interesting shapes.
In terms of the relationship of Perkins taxonomy to the overall image schema that I am 
describing here, we might say that what he is effectively doing is mapping different types 
of knowledge across an expanse of metaphorical, phenomenal space. His ‘possessive’ 
knowledge is that which appears to have something of the quality of an object, placed at 
some distance but clearly within the line of sight. Like other ‘visual’ objects it can be ‘seen’ 
simultaneously by a number of different observers and has something of the permanence, 
fixity, and unchanging nature of prototypical objects in lived experience. In this schema the 
ideal object of possessive knowledge may be the empirical fact, established through 
deduction, built on firm foundations of scientific research, and unwavering in its resistance 
to the attacks of falsification. It is a noun in the sentences of meaningful discourse.
Performative knowledge does not have this object status but, as the term implies in Austin, 
rather adopts the position of an action. Here is knowledge, or perhaps ‘knowing’, which 
engages as physical action, or which moves nomadically through space. Performative 
knowledge functions as a verb, or as many verbs, and its role is to pick, to pack, to grasp, to 
fold, to tear, to chop, to walk, to talk, to write, to run, and to never set itself into stone and 
never to stand still. Its space of operation is not out in the open where it can be skewered in 
the triangulating gaze of multiple I’s, but at the limin between body and world. It lives in 
the interstices between the muscles of the arm and the bark of the tree, and it is also in the 
swing of the axe. It is motile, ductile, flowing, flowering, and possibly shimmering but it is 
never caught motionless between the pages of a book.
Proactive knowledge is closer yet. As Perkins says, it is ultimately dispositional, and has 
none of the qualities of an object or of an action. This is the knowledge or the knowing 
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which is inseparable from ‘being’ and therefore is the subject of the sentence. Proactive 
knowledge swings the axe.
This explication of Perkins’ model demonstrates that, whilst the model contains three types 
of knowing against Polanyi’s two, and whilst attention is drawn to different aspects, 
qualities, and interactions, the same broad schema is in place.  Different types of 
knowledge are conceptualised, and thereby distinguished, using an overall metaphorical 
schema which arranges these ‘knowings’ across an imaginary space, with the features of 
this knowledge determined by the entailments of the metaphor.  Just as the ontology of 
entities and relationships across actual space is dependent upon certain embodied 
inevitabilities; objects which are close can be touched whereas objects which are distant 
can only be seen, for example; so these inevitabilities are carried over as entailments of the 
overall metaphor.  
In order to bring out in more detail the nature of these entailments I would like to consider 
one further example of knowledge organization.
The Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom Hierarchy
Where is the Life we have lost in living?
Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?
Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?
(Eliot, 1934)
.  
The third example of the organisation of knowledge that I would like to hold up is the ‘Data 
Information Knowledge Wisdom Hierarchy’ associated with Russell Ackoff (1989)  
although elements of it are prefigured in Milan Zeleny (1987), and in more poetic form in 
T.S. Eliot (above) and in the lyrics of a song by Frank Zappa45.  A full and highly effective 
metaphorical analysis of this model, bringing out the schematic assumptions which 
                                                
45 The 1979 song ‘Packard’s Goose’ by Frank Zappa, on the Album ‘Joe’s Garage Act II and III 
contains the lines: Information is not knowledge/Knowledge is not wisdom/Wisdom is not truth/Truth is not 
beauty/Beauty is not love/Love is not music/and Music is THE BEST.(Tower Records, 1979).
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underpin understanding is to be found in Jonathan Hey’s essay The Data, Information, 
Knowledge, Wisdom Chain: The Metaphorical Link (2004).  Here I propose merely to 
reiterate some of the main points of Hey’s work and relate them to the overall schema that I 
am offering, as well as cross-referencing them to parallels within the models suggested by 
Polanyi and Perkins.
To introduce this model, a brief description of what is meant by the ‘Data Information 
Knowledge Wisdom Hierarchy’ is in order. As indicated in the name, the model organises 
the range of epistemological phenomena into four categories, these are:
o Data – this indicates the set of individual facts, figures, sensory impressions, etc 
pertinent to the situation.  Data is regarded as essentially meaningless, although it is 
the raw material from which meaning is derived. 
o Information - is regarded as data which has undergone some kind of organisation.  
Data sets may be divided into categories according to some criteria; individual data 
items may be linked together according to some salient feature.  
o Knowledge – this is, essentially, information which has been internalised by the 
person such that they might put it to use. An important feature of knowledge is that, 
whereas information and data may reside in texts, objects, and events, knowledge 
acquisition, ownership, and transfer can only be effected by human agents.  Such 
acquisition and transfer will necessarily involve the use of information and data 
however. 
o Wisdom46  - this is seen as the possession of knowledge such that one is able not 
only to observe patterns of information within data and make intelligent connections 
between different patterns, but also to feel the principles which underlie the patterns 
themselves.  Wisdom allows one to see these various patterns in their contexts and 
to be able to remain independent of immersion in that context oneself.  
The analysis that Hey conducts focuses exclusively on the first three elements of the
hierarchy, and points out how common understandings of the model draw on certain key 
                                                
46 Hey does not address wisdom in the cited paper, although I will be referring to it below.
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metaphors.  These are primarily substance metaphors, in which data is conceived as having 
a different substantive quality to information etc.  There are, in addition, a number of 
spatial metaphors at play in Hey’s analysis, and in the model more generally, which I will 
address below. He goes on to discuss how transformations between the different elements 
in the model, or ‘links’ in the ‘chain’, are conceptualised.  Here I will briefly summarise 
Hey’s analysis in these areas.
Data
Data is understood primarily as a physical resource, and the metaphorical form of this 
resource has a number of properties which distinguish it from information and knowledge.  
Firstly it is conceptualised as a large number of individual, separate, atomistic, entities, like 
an aggregate of small stones, or a pile of leaves blown by the wind.  Items of data have an 
ontological irreducibility which prevents their being understood as composites themselves; 
just as when one is collecting pebbles from the beach one would not think to increase one’s 
collection by splitting each pebble in half, so individual datum cannot be divided.  Data is 
also understood as pre-existing any efforts to effect its collection; we conceive it as simply 
‘out there’ waiting for some kind of exploratory practice to discover it.   Such entities might 
be ‘collected’, ‘mined’, ‘gathered’, or ‘stored’; on the other hand, because items of data are 
unconnected to every other item, they might also easily be lost, fall away from one another, 
disaggregate, or slip through the cracks.  
Information
Moving up the hierarchy to information, Hey notes that metaphorical concepts of it show 
significant overlap with those of data.  It is also conceived as being ‘corpuscular’ and 
‘discreet’ with each item of information being imaginable as distinct from every other.  
There is also a shared sense of its being ‘out there’, pre-existing our efforts to acquire it.  
Hey also notes that with both data and information, when the volume of either is large, we 
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begin to think of this in terms not of a collection of discreet particulate objects but as a kind 
of liquid.  We might talk of the ‘flow’ of information, or of ‘drowning’ in an excess of it.  
In this sense it retains some of the properties of the corpuscular but also, like sand through 
an hour glass, can pass like a liquid.  Hey goes on to locate this metaphor of liquidity in 
relation to its possible origins in the affordances it presents to the body, and this starts to 
become significant in distinguishing data from information.  As Hey explains, affordance is 
the term that Gibson (1977, 1979) gives to the properties of (physical) entities that we 
perceive and to which we respond in an embodied way.  So for example, the handle of a 
tool presents itself to the body in such a way that its ‘handleability’ is experienced as a part 
of the perception of that object, in fact the primary perception. As part of a metaphor of 
information then, if we are looking for a substance metaphor which embodies this sense of 
there being ‘too much for us to grasp’, then a substance which offers no such affordance 
would be appropriate.  In this regard, such a metaphorical substance acquires the properties 
of a liquid.  An excess of information is therefore understood as being ‘impossible to get a 
handle on’, ‘hard to grasp’, or ‘slippery’, and we run the risk of ‘drowning’ in it.  
It might be intuited from this use of the language of affordance that there is, in the 
distinguishing of information from data, the beginnings of an implied human agent figuring 
in the ground of the epistemology.  Even though we have conceived of data in substantive 
terms, the presence of the body as the provider of an affordance to that substance is 
minimal.  As we begin to consider the organisation of information however there is a tacit 
understanding that such substance is under the approach of an intentional agent; the 
provider of significant form.  There is the feeling that what was previously inert data is 
beginning to lean in our direction and organise itself into structures of information which at 
least have the possibility of purchase, even if our grasp is inadequate and the structure too 
frail.
Hey draws out this epistemological distinction in the metaphor, suggesting that the point at 
which information parts company with data is in the sense of what Hey calls ‘attributes’.   
He draws our attention to the idea that information can be ‘sensitive’ or ‘pertinent’.  It can 
be more or less ‘salient’ or ‘valuable’ in a way that ‘raw’ data cannot.  These attributes, 
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which are awarded to the information in such a way that they seem to be part of its 
ontology, are inevitably actually derived from the relationship established between such 
potential information and the origin of this potential, which is the purposive human user.
Knowledge
Hey’s account of knowledge metaphors draws a partial distinction in its conception as a 
substance but more extensively in terms of its assumed location.  He notes that the 
substantiality of knowledge is variable across the liquid/solid boundary, with knowledge
being variously expressed as hard, slippery, well (or ill) formed, bounded, robust, etc. as 
well as possibly being fluid, slippery, sticky, or amorphous, or dry.  Similarly it might be 
‘hard to grasp’ or ‘difficult to pin down’.  In this regard it can be seen as contiguous with, 
or possibly overlapping, the substance metaphors used for data or information, which, as 
we have already noted, make extensive use of liquid metaphor, simply moving this 
metaphor in the direction of a possible solidity.  The more notable distinction is that, whilst 
both data and information are placed entirely outside of the subject (at various degrees of 
remove or affordance) knowledge takes up residence inside the body of the knower.  Hey 
refers here to a conceptualisation in which knowledge is thought of as being internalised , 
‘found within the heads of employees’.  There is also a strong suggestion of possible 
ownership with regard to knowledge which features much less in understandings of data or 
information.  We might say we ‘have’ knowledge, or that we ‘possess’ it;  we might also 
‘gain’, ‘acquire’, ‘own’, ‘share’, or otherwise ‘benefit from’ knowledge.  The closeness of 
ownership, to the extent where we might even begin to consider our belongings as 
extensions of our self, is seen here to be an entailment of this metaphor, giving knowledge 
the quality not of a dispossessed and distant object, but as a member of the society of our 
being; an occupant of the sovereign state of self.
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Wisdom (Beyond Understanding)
It is at this point that I have to abandon Hey’s excellent analysis as he confined himself to 
only the first three links in what he refers to as the ‘Data Information Knowledge Wisdom 
Chain’.  The reason he gives for his decision to not continue his analysis into the area of 
wisdom is intriguing; he writes that; ‘there already appears to be enough confusion 
regarding Data, Information and Knowledge without heading into considerably less well-
defined territory’ (2004: 3).  Considering the efficiency of the metaphorical analysis he has 
carried out so far it would be surprising if this choice of words did not reflect a certain 
perception of what was understood by wisdom47.   Hey here makes use of an 
unacknowledged ‘territory’ metaphor in which the location for the metaphorical ontological 
status of this wisdom is a place which is ‘less well-defined’.  This territory toward which 
Hey seems to be pointing is, apparently, a place of possible confusion, where figure and 
ground become difficult to distinguish, and where the stuff of thought and the thoughts of 
stuff are in a state of rarified mutual diffusion.  Wisdom, as Hey seems to imply through the 
expression of his refusal to ‘go there’, is located at no remove from the body of the knower 
and is almost entirely pro-active, dispositional, and unextended.  It avoids categorisation as 
a kind of ‘substance’ because it takes part in the stance itself.   
Beyond Wisdom
Although Ackoff and others terminate the ascent up the hierarchy of knowing at the point 
of wisdom, others make the leap from the summit into the clear air above.  Zeleny, who 
borrowed from Eliot and Zappa to make management out of poetry, included an additional 
realm above and beyond the grip of understanding and the call of wisdom.  He referred to 
this type of knowing as enlightenment and described it as ‘not only answering or 
                                                
47 Ackoff’s original version of the DIKW hierarchy (1989) actually contained an additional layer 
between knowledge and wisdom which he called understanding.  He distinguished these three layers 
temporarally, suggesting that whilst knowledge tended to age rapidly, understanding had an aura of 
permanence about it.  However, only wisdom was, he felt, truly permanent.
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understanding why (wisdom), but attaining the sense of truth, the sense of right and wrong,
and having it socially accepted, respected and sanctioned’ (Zeleny, in Sharma, 2004).
As is possibly evident from this account, the major aspect of the metaphorical analysis that 
Hey carries out of the DIKW hierarchy is in terms of what kind of substance the various 
understanding of knowing are conceived as.  Our attention is drawn to these metaphorical 
substantive distinctions and the various entailments of such distinctions.  It is demonstrated 
that the allusions to the various grades of knowing as solid or liquid or (possibly) 
evanescent gas are not made randomly but indicate the consistent application of a 
metaphorical dimension of substantiality.  Hardness and softness, resilience and fluidity, 
robustness and ‘airiness’ are measurements on a coherent scale of imagined ‘objectified’ 
knowing.  The harder the knowing the easier it is to grasp, the more gaseous that knowing 
the more likely it is to rise and disperse.  Allied to this is a consistent pattern of 
transformation between one substantial form and another.  Atomistic grains of hard data 
become liquid in large quantity, which can in turn be meaningfully pooled into information.  
Such information might then be alchemically transformed through human agency into the 
poetic solidity of knowledge.   These transformations, familiar to us from the real world of 
physical embodied experience, have an intuitive structure, and it is the metaphorical 
application of this structure which, as Hey demonstrates, gives structure to the otherwise 
inconceivable relations between these different knowledge forms.  
This concept of substance as both a metaphor for types of knowing and as offering a 
metaphor for structured transformation, is also a feature of my analysis of knowledge, to be 
developed below, but here it is insightful to pull out other aspects of the DIKW model 
which Hey makes more fleeting reference to, or which do not form part of his analysis.
In common with most metaphorical structures, the DIKW model makes use of a number of 
spatialising metaphors.  The first of these is one which I have already indicated and 
unpacked in the discussions of Polanyi’s tacit/explicit dimension and Perkins’ remapping of 
this dimension around the landmarks of the proactive/performative/possessive.  As noted 
above, both of those models make use of this horizontal spatial extension which 
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distinguishes the proximal from the distal and allows for different experiences of knowing 
to be placed, ordered, and moved along that dimension.  The possessive and the explicit are 
assumed to be at some objective distance, existing apart from and discontinuous with the 
person.  They might be said to represent items of knowing located toward the far end of this 
horizontal space of knowing.  In terms of the other, stickier end, both models also make use 
of the peculiar logic of this extension in which extreme proximity places the object of 
knowledge not only close to the body of the subject but possibly inside of that body.  
Polanyi’s tacit knowledge and Perkins’ proactive knowledge are, in different ways, aspects 
or dispositions of subjectivity, inseparable from the person to whom they are inherent.  This 
horizontal dimension which orders knowing in terms of the proximal and the distal also 
underpins the DIKW model.  
When we treat data as something which we might have to seek, gather, or otherwise 
journey toward, there is the suggestion that it has a place on the landscape of knowing 
which is distinctly ‘over there’ and may require some survey or experimental activity to 
locate.  It might even be speculated that this model extends the horizontal dimension 
beyond where it might commonly terminate toward the distant horizon48.  As suggested by 
Hey above, the transformation from data to wisdom and beyond is metaphorically 
understood not only as a change in possible form but as a change in the relative location of 
that knowing.  There is the suggestion of movement from its placement outside of and away 
from the body, through an approach which brings it within the range of haptic affordance 
culminating in its eventual internalisation as knowledge, and possibly its incorporation
into the structures of wisdom and enlightenment. The distant object is lost to view as it 
moves within, and as this objectivity is elided with our approach to the data, or by data’s
approach to ourselves, the horizontal dimension that stretches to the horizon finds it 
proximal termination at the core of our self.  Far more than the previous examples, the 
DIKW model maps epistemology’s entry into the body.  Each link in the chain from data to 
                                                
48 An analysis of how the concept of ‘horizon’ figures within image schema related to knowledge is 
outside of the focus of this writing.  However, it has begun to feature as an element within artworks associated 
with this research.  Documentation of this work, (which I am considering an appendix to the main body of 
work presented in the blog and discussed in this writing) can be viewed online at 
http://theconferencereport.net/exhibition/horizon/ (Accessed 18/06/08). 
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information, from information to knowledge, and from knowledge to wisdom, welds the 
actor to the act of knowing.  
Moreover, there seems to be a clear correspondence in this articulation with the previous 
two knowledge structure models considered above.  In Polanyi and Perkins there is this 
similar sense that as an understanding of knowledge which arrays different forms of 
knowing across horizontal space, the ‘tacit dimension’, as Polanyi calls it (Polanyi, 1983), 
brings with it certain entailments concerning visibility, ‘handleability’, interiority, etc. and 
these entailments seem to emerge from a common schema which structures that space in 
terms of the common embodied experience of (apparently) being at the centre of it.
A second dimension which the DIKW model serves to exemplify, and which does not 
feature overtly in either Polanyi or Perkins, is that of verticality, (this was briefly 
introduced earlier within the context of a contextual metaphor linking UP with GOOD).  In 
terms of this understanding, it is relevant to note at this point that the model is almost 
always referred to as a ‘hierarchy’ (or occasionally ‘pyramid’) and the transformations 
through the various grades of knowing are conceptualised as movement not only from the 
distal to the proximal, but also vertically through ascending levels toward greater and 
greater (higher and higher) orders of knowledge.  This is also a feature of illustrations of 
the model, which typically graph the process of knowledge acquisition as a series of 
upward steps toward the elevated state of wisdom or the possibly even more aerial and 
ascendant rising toward the sunny uplands of enlightenment.  This seems to be an example 
of the relationship introduced earlier between SEEING and KNOWING.  Although space
does not permit a full analysis of the functioning of the vertical dimension within this 
epistemological schema it is perhaps relevant to note in passing that there seems to be a 
consistent correspondence between height, seeing, and knowing.  As Isaac Newton 
reputedly put it ‘If I have seen farther than other men it is because I had stood on the 
shoulders of giants’49. 
                                                
49 Although this quotation is routinely attributed to Newton it is likely to have been in use previously.  
For a (Tristram) Shandean overview of it usage see  MERTON, R. (1965) On the Shoulders of Giants, New 
York,Harcourt.
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Explicitness Revisited
In this section I revisit Polanyi’s notion of the explicit, arguing that the binary division 
which Polanyi invokes prevents certain subtleties in the idea of the explicit from becoming 
manifest.  As we have seen, other epistemological systems which overlap significantly with 
Polanyi’s in the overall use of a schema based on the spatially-embedded body, carve up 
this space differently and articulate elements of the schema which are less easy to identify 
in Polanyi’s tacit/explicit divide. The particular structural aspect of this schematic 
explicitness relevant to this discussion is a distinction between the concept of the explicit 
object, and the metaphorical act of explication through which the object comes into being.  
Perkins’ model, which marks out a broadly similar territory for experiential knowing, 
includes the middle term of the performative, lying outside of the disposition of the subject 
but not so far removed that it is only available to the eye as an object of scopic 
possessibility.  Performative knowledge, as we have seen, exists metaphorically in the 
space between the hands; a space of reciprocation, where the hands can reach out to grasp 
the stuff of thought, but can also shape that stuff into the form of a new object, rolling it out 
into interpersonal, intersubjective space.  The performative of Perkins, therefore, is not 
radically separate from the explicit of Polanyi, but might be seen as constituting the active 
elements at work in the production of the explicit.
In the terms populating the Data Information Knowledge Wisdom Hierarchy of Ackoff, 
whilst data has many of the properties of the explicit, so this explicitness is not precisely 
synonymous with data.  The explicit blends into the definitions of information and 
knowledge, incorporating the sense of agency, intentionality, and engagement that these 
concepts confer. 
Additionally, regarding the distinction made earlier between knowledge and knowing, I 
suggested that this difference had significance for how an understanding of an 
epistemology proceeded.  In returning to the term explicit, this distinction may again be 
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relevant.  To the extent that an understanding of explicit knowledge is predicated on the 
‘knowledge object’ rather than the more processual, intersubjective understanding implied 
by the term knowing, then this aspect of the explicit is likely to be suppressed. Conversely, 
the use of the verb conveys something of the sense of a performative, and even haptic, 
understanding.  As Catherine Rouby (citing Classen, 1998), puts it in ‘Olfaction, Taste, and 
Cognition’ (2002),
In addition to the olfactory and gustatory links to cognition discussed 
earlier, Classen's archeology of the sensory subconscious of the English 
language reveals that many English terms for ‘thought’ are, in fact, tactile 
or kinaesthetic in origin.  These include ‘apprehend’, ‘brood’, ‘cogitate’, 
‘comprehend’, ‘conceive’, ‘grasp’, ‘mull’, ‘perceive’, ‘ponder’, 
‘ruminate’, and ‘understand’.  The predominance of tactile imagery in 
words dealing with intellectual functions indicates that thought is, or was, 
experienced primarily in terms of touch. (Rouby, 2002: 70)
The Explicit Touch
The category of the explicit is developed particularly elegantly by neurologist Raymond 
Tallis in The Explicit Animal (1991), in which he identifies the ability to be explicit as a 
defining human feature, linked to consciousness and intentionality.  Critiquing both 
computational views of mind and narrow account from evolutionary psychology, Tallis 
builds an understanding of human experience in which active and outgoing.  He takes 
particular issue with theories which couch this experience as a kind of linguistic effect, 
resulting from our embedding within an inert network of language, rather than being active 
unfolders of that language into the world.  Referring to Structuralist and Poststructuralist 
understandings of language and thought, he writes that,
Post-Saussurean thinkers for whom even verbal expression, apparently the 
most deliberate and self-aware form of behaviour, is determined by the 
structures of the system, so that it seems as if 'language speaks us' rather 
than that we speak language.  For such thinkers, the linguistic decentring 
of the speaking subject opens the way to a more radical displacement of 
the self. (1991: 15)
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Rather than this structurally determined, decentred version of being which offers, 
at best, a ‘view from nowhere’, human being and human expression, he claims, is 
an active intervention into the space of thought and knowledge. This 
understanding uses a schema of space in which potential knowledge constitutes an 
epistemological landscape with the conscious self at the centre, mirroring the 
phenomenological placement of the body within the physical landscape.  This is 
reminiscent of Merleau-Ponty’s claim that,
Our own body is in the world as the heart is in the organism: it keeps the 
visible spectacle constantly alive, it breathes life into it and sustains it 
inwardly, and with it forms a system (1962: 203)
When we stand in a field and look around we are not passive recipients of sensory data; 
undifferentiated figures in the smooth and absolute space of Newton’s, ‘Absolute space in 
its own nature, without relation to anything external, remain(ing) always similar and 
immovable’.  Our sense, including our sense of our selves, is one of activity, invention, and 
intervention.  
Tallis further suggests in his later book The Kingdom of Infinite Space (2008) that;
We might imagine the newborn infant simply being its body, in the sense 
of living its experiences, but not having an explicit relationship to it.  It 
gradually comes to realize that this body is itself.  A blush of awareness 
evolves into a many-layered sense ‘That I am the body’.  At that point a 
gap opens up between the infant and its own body as it realizes that this 
body is its own. (Tallis, 2008: p.48).
The explicitness of the natural world, including the natural presence of one’s own body in 
that world, is the phenomenal experience of its being rolled out before us through the 
agency of our active embodiment, and it is this apparently unique human ability to put 
ourselves at the centre of an unfurled world that Tallis refers to.   
This interpretation of the concept of the explicit is notably different from Polanyi’s, 
discussed above.  In Polanyi the explicit has the character of an object or location sited at 
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the end of the unrolled process of knowledge acquisition.  In Tallis, explicitness is 
performative, engaging with, and simultaneously co-creating the world in a hands-on way.  
To this extent, Tallis’ rendition of the explicit has much in common with idea of the haptic 
noted earlier, a system which Gibson defines as follows:
The haptic system … is an apparatus by which the individual gets 
information about both the environment and his body.  He feels an object 
relative to the body and the body relative to an object.  It is a perceptual 
system by which animals and men (humans) are literally in touch with the 
environment. (1968: 97)
Paul Rodaway in ‘Sensuous Geographies’ (1994) carries out an extensive survey on the 
relationships struck between body and world, part of which is negotiated through what he 
refers to as this ‘haptic’ sense.   Citing Gibson, Rodaway goes on to delineate the various 
terms through which this negotiation takes place and the apparatus gets information.  
Focusing particularly on the tactile aspects of this way of knowing, Rodaway point out that 
touch,
… is more that the action of the fingers feeling the texture of surfaces. 
Touch involves the whole body reaching out to the things constituting the 
environment and those things, or that environment, coming into contact 
with the body…. This is the basic reciprocity of the haptic system: to 
touch is always to be touched. (1994: 44)
He goes on to suggest four types of ‘touch’ which he argues as significant for the 
experience of knowing and being; Global Touch, Reach Touch, Extended Touch, and Mind 
Touch.
Global Touch is Rodaway’s terms for proprioceptive presence and the sense one has of 
existing as a body at a certain location in space.
Reach Touch is described as a property of the limbs, and is represented by the grasp of the 
hand and the stretch of the foot.
Extended Touch is that which operates through intermediary tools and technologies; the 
cane of the blind person and axe of the woodcutter.
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Mind Touch (which he elsewhere refers to as Imagined Touch), perhaps most salient for 
this analysis, is the mobilization of the felt sense50 as a means of conceptualizing concepts 
which would otherwise be inconceivable.  As he puts it, 
… haptic experience (is) rooted in (the) memory and expectation.  This is 
demonstrated both in our use of touch metaphors to describe other 
sensuous experiences and the creative recall of haptic experiences, as 
when reading a description in a novel or when remembering a treasured 
experience. (Rodaway, 1994: 54)
In developing this use of touch as a source of metaphors, Rodaway cites as an example the 
common expression ‘to keep in touch’ as an indicator that the tactile reciprocal contact of 
skin on skin is part of the cognitive poetics of intimacy.  Although he makes no reference to 
the specific theoretical frameworks used here, this metaphor, in which intimacy is 
understood as closeness, is well established within the literature on conceptual metaphor  
(Kovecses, 2001, Lakoff and Johnson, 1981)
The up-close and personal nature of touching and being touched supports the use of this 
sense as indicative not only of physical proximity but also of emotional contact.  To be 
‘touched’ is part of a vocabulary of meaningfulness which draws less on scopic detachment 
(and the bloodless rationalism such objectivity is occasionally accused of) and more on the 
entertainment of close mutual holding.51  This intimacy of epistemological relationship is 
alien to the formal endeavours of science but it is firmly enshrined within the traditions of 
art and aesthetics.   As Suzanne Langer writes,
(A) work of art is an expressive form created for our perception through 
sense or imagination, and what it expresses is human feeling.  The word 
                                                
50 The concept of a ‘felt sense’ has been developed extensively within the context of counseling and 
‘self-actualisation’ by Eugene Gendlin through the technique of focusing, in which practitioners claim to 
develop ontological awareness through guided attention to the inner state of the body.  Unfortunately, the 
limits of this writing do not allow an extensive analysis of this usage.
GENDLIN, E. T. (1996) Focusing-oriented psychotherapy: a manual of the experiential method, New York; 
London, Guilford Press. 
51 Entertain - [Origin: 1425–75; late ME entertenen to hold mutually < MF entretenir   VL 
*intertenére, equiv. to L inter- INTER- + tenére to hold ]  entertain. Dictionary.com. Dictionary.com 
Unabridged (v 1.1). Random House, Inc. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/entertain (accessed: August 
05, 2008).
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“feeling” must be taken here in its broadest sense, meaning everything that 
can be felt, from physical sensation, pain and comfort, excitement and 
repose, to the most complex emotions, intellectual tensions, or the steady 
feeling-tones of a conscious human life (Langer, 1957: 15). 
This understanding of the explicit in which it is intimately related to activity and to the 
haptic; in which we shape the physical world even as it shapes us through this intentional 
touch of the hand, is developed by Max Frisch and Michael Bullock  (1959) under the 
designation homo faber, according to the rubric of which we again find ourselves partly 
defined by this haptic, manual, shaping ability.  
A more active mobilization of the use of touch is found in ‘The Human Condition’  by 
Hannah Arendt (1974), in which she distinguishes homo faber from animal laborans,
describing the activity of the latter, (which she associates with ‘animal being’), as being 
confined to the intimate and the domestic52.  Homo Faber, on the other hand, in Arendt’s 
formulation, moves out of the personal sphere and into the world, or as Lewis Hinchman 
describes it in an analysis of Arendt, 
In contrast to labor, work (homo faber) is the activity that corresponds to 
the ‘unnaturalness’ of human existence.  If ‘life’ and the private realm 
locate the activity of animal laborans, then ‘the world’ locates homo 
faber.  Work is, literally, the working up of the world, the production of 
things-in-the-world.  If animal laborans is caught up in nature and in the 
cyclical movement of the body’s life processes, then homo faber is, as 
Arendt puts it in The Human Condition, ‘free to produce and free to 
destroy.’ (1994: 234) 
In these descriptions, the explicatory advance made by our body into the world allows the 
body to shape the world that it touches, (even as it leaves the self behind in the gap that 
Tallis indicates above).  There is a sense that our hands and feet precede our occupation of 
the space toward which we are reaching and moving, and that these corporeal extensions 
prepare the ground for our arrival.  Feet stretch forward and pull the earth toward us, 
bringing our desires and our selves together into the here and now of where we want to be.   
                                                
52 Arendt works up this distinction into a critique of certain aspects of modernity (reminiscent of 
Benjamin).  She claims the focus on individual prosperity, production and consumption, has diminished the 
intersubjective world of homo faber in favour of the alienating, simply social being of animal laborans.
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Hands reach out and open doors at exactly the right moment for us to walk through. As 
Drew Leder (1990) describes it, the world is ecstatically thrown out by the onrush of our 
senses, and the sense of self recedes in the wake of this explicit forward march53.
As suggested in Rodaway, above, this reaching and probing and shaping of the world is not 
only physical, but is also conceptual.  The active interventions which define us are not only 
excursions into physical nature but also incursions into conceptual culture, including those 
aspects of culture which might variously be understood as knowledge.
In terms of the analytic framework presented earlier, this suggests the development of a 
conceptual metaphor or schema in which the fully embodied physical action of shaping the 
physical environment with the hands (and shaping one’s location in that environment with 
the feet through walking) is transformed into an understanding of sapience.  To reiterate 
Pinker, who describes the cognitive process of metaphor construction as involving 
‘scaffolding whose slots are filled with symbols for more abstract concerns like states, 
possessions, ideas, and desires’ (1997: 355), in this case the slots in the scaffolding 
originally reserved for touching and walking are filled with symbols for thinking and 
knowing. As Andre Leroi-Gourhan puts it:
Originally, our hands were nothing but pincers used to hold stones; Man’s 
genius has been to turn them into the daily more sophisticated servants of 
his thoughts as a homo faber and as a homo sapiens (Leroi-Gourhan, in 
Nespoulous et al., 1986: 49).
An epistemology incorporating this understanding is markedly different from one which is 
primarily scopic.  In this interpretation of the haptic54, the performative, and the explicit, 
knowledge is less an object that pre-exists one’s attempts to ‘find it’, but rather resides 
within the active process of cognitive shaping itself.
                                                
53 Mark Johnson in ‘The Meaning of the Body’ (2007) draws on Leder’s description of the ecstatic and 
recessive body to stage a convincing narrative of the phenomenological mind/body dualism which haunts 
much philosophy.
54 A detailed analysis of the anatomical development of ‘haptic knowledge’ in infants can be found in 
HATWELL, Y., STRERI, A. & GENTAZ, E. (2003) Touching for knowing: cognitive psychology of haptic 
manual perception, Amsterdam, John Benjamins.
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Ongoing – Walking and Thinking
I have made several references in the passages above concerning a perceived parallel 
between the explicitly haptic and the act of moving through a space.  In the first there is the 
sense of the hands flowing out into the space in front of the body to craft the state of that 
space, and in the second there is the suggested possibility of the feet proceeding into that 
space and enacting the establishment of such a state.  Here I would like to advance this 
connection a little further, and explore how this connection plays itself out within the 
conceptual metaphor of epistemology I have offered so far.  
The relationship between walking and thinking has already been alluded to in the earlier 
discussion of the idea of ‘procedural knowledge’.  In that section I introduced the notion 
that the concept of ‘procedural’ rests on a metaphorical schema in which the acquisition of 
knowledge is understood as progress along a path to a goal or destination.   Some writers 
have suggested that this connection is not only metaphorical but is also actively instantiated 
as actual practice, shaped by and shaping of experience and knowing (see Careri, 2002; 
Adams et al., 2001; Seamon and Buttimer, 1980; De Certeau, 1984; Gregory, 1994; Solnit, 
2001). 
In Wanderlust – a history of walking Rebecca Solnit  (2001) writes about the extensive 
historical connection between perambulation and cogitation.  Tracing a lineage from the 
peripatetic philosophers of Ancient Greece, the ambulatory Paris of Rousseau and 
Baudelaire, and Charles Darwin’s famous ‘sandwalk’, she identifies the close relationships 
that are suggested, both literally and metaphorically, when we consider the operation of 
‘the mind at three miles an hour’ (2001: 14).  She goes on to link the contact of foot with 
ground to that haptic contact through which the hand engages with the world.  Connecting 
walking and working, Solnit draws on the language of affordances, and refers to the 
extension of the body through tools, and their increasing detachment such that these tools 
take the body into the world but are disconnected from that body.  
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Walking returns the body to its original limits again, to something supple, 
sensitive, and vulnerable, but walking itself extends into the world as do 
those tools that augment the body.  The path is an extension of walking, 
the places set aside for walking are monuments to that pursuit, and 
walking is a mode of making the world as well as being in it.  Thus the 
walking body can be traced in the places it has made, paths, parks, and 
sidewalks are traces of the acting out of imagination and desire; walking 
sticks, shoes, maps, canteens, and backpacks are further material results of 
that desire. Walking shares with making and working that crucial element 
of engagement of the body and the mind with the world, of knowing the 
world through the body and the body through the world. (Solnit, 2001: 29) 
This engagement is not the static rapture of the empirical objectifying gaze, a situated but 
stationary viewpoint which is also critiqued by Steven Braddon (1986) in relation to the 
knowing associated with cognitive psychology.   In ‘Thinking on Your Feet: the 
consequences of action for the relation of perception and cognition’, Braddon makes a case 
for the more active, ambulatory, advance suggested by the knowing walk.
Thinking ordinarily differs from active perceiving but the two must mesh 
to yield creative accomplishments.  By keeping subjects stationary, 
experimenters treat passive observation as the paradigmatic case of 
information acquisition and treat action as an influence on performance 
better minimized than explored.  The data and theory presented (here) 
suggest that if subjects spent more time thinking on their feet, cognitive 
psychology would be more firmly grounded in reality. (1986: 148) 
Michel De Certeau makes overt these connections between spatialised epistemological 
relations and whether the occupation of that space is static or mobile. 
The long poem of walking manipulates spatial organizations, no matter how 
panoptic they may be: it is neither foreign to them (it can take place only 
within them) nor in conformity with them (it does not receive its identity 
from them). It creates shadows and ambiguities within them. It inserts its 
multitudinous references and citations into them (social models, cultural 
mores, personal factors). Within them it is itself the effect of successive 
encounters and occasions that constantly alter it and make it the other's 
blazon: in other words, it is like a peddler, carrying something surprising, 
transverse or attractive compared with the usual choice. These diverse 
aspects provide the basis of a rhetoric. They can even be said to define it. 
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(De Certeau, 1984: 101) 
The suggestion that De Certeau makes of a metaphorical link not only between walking and 
knowing but also between walking and language is usefully compared to the critique Tallis 
makes of ‘Post-Saussurian’ theories above.  In this passage meaning and meaningfulness
are not deferred across a tissue of signifiers with the person constructed arbitrarily and 
passively within that discourse.  Rather, the person is set in motion such that their 
experience of the space of knowing and being is shaped by the moving centre.  Walking, 
and by implication knowing, are considered psychogeographic acts of poetic engagement.  
The act of walking, which is used here as both a metaphor for thinking and as a prop and 
accompaniment to thought and knowledge acquisition, suggests a different relationship to 
the space of epistemology than the transparent vacuum traditionally (if unconsciously) 
associated with scientific endeavour, and like the intimacy of touch, one more easily 
associated perhaps with art activity. 
In ‘Walkscapes: Walking as an Aesthetic Practice’, Francesca Careri indicates the extensive 
crossover that has taken place between the practice of walking and the practice of art.  
Taking in Dada, Surrealism, Lettrism, Situationism, Minimalism and Land Art, Careri  
(2002) shows how such pedestrianism transforms the conceptual space through which the 
artist/researcher moves.  Referring particularly, but not exclusively, to urban rambling, 
Careri mixes in the metaphor of the sea to describe the transformed experience of the city 
realized by such experiments in human drift. ‘What the rovings of the artists discover’, he 
suggests, ‘is a liquid city, an amniotic fluid where the spaces of the elsewhere take 
spontaneous form, an urban archipelago in which to navigate by drifting. A city in which 
the spaces of staying are the islands in the great sea formed by the spaces of going.’ (Careri, 
2002: 21).  In this quotation, Careri is also employing the metaphor of substance, discussed 
above, in which the ‘hard’ space of knowledge is transformed into something ‘soft’ and 
‘flowing’ through which knowing might proceed.  
Rebecca Solnit also explores this connection between walking and aesthetic knowing, 
incorporating in her analysis the works of walking artists Richard Long, Hamish Fulton, 
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and the Marina Abramovic/Ulay collaboration Great Wall Walk (1988).  In addition to 
these literal walks, Solnit also points out works which allude to walking, such as Robert 
Smithson’s Spiral Jetty and some of Carl Andre’s large-scale sculptural work.  Solnit 
quotes Andre as saying, 
My idea of a piece of sculpture is a road…. That is, a road doesn’t reveal 
itself at any particular point or from any particular point.   Roads appear 
and disappear … We don’t have a single point of view for a road at all, 
except for a moving one, moving along it (Solnit, 2001: 269).
Solnit goes on to compare Andre’s sculptures to ‘Chinese scrolls, (which) reveal 
themselves over time in response to the movements of the looker; they incorporate travel 
into their form’ (2001: 269). The suggestion is that in order for the looker(?) to truly ‘get to 
know’ the artwork they must engage in the explicatory act of walking up to, around, and 
past it.  
From this it can be noted that certain forms of knowing, particularly those associated with 
practices that are not empirical or which make no claim to ‘objectivity’, respond better to 
an approach which relies on metaphors of walking than those of seeing.  In this regard they 
share certain elements of the overall schema with the metaphors of touch and making 
explicit that are discussed above.
Before and After Physics 55
This brief overview indicates something of the rich relationships that arise between the 
sensory metaphors of walking and touching, and the abstracts categories of thinking and 
knowing, in all its forms. The history is too engagingly complex to enter into in more detail 
here, so in order to bring out some specific points salient to this writing I would like to take 
two brief slices through that history; the first at a point some time in the early Middle Ages, 
                                                
55 I hope I might be forgiven the indulgence in calling this section  ‘Before and After Physics’.  This is 
the name of a gallery exhibition I held in February 2008 featuring artworks which arose from some of the 
ideas in this section.  Documentation of this exhibition is available at 
http://theconferencereport.net/exhibition/  (Accessed 25/06/08)
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and the second around 2005.56  Particular attention will be paid to the metaphor of walking
as it will be shown that this is the most salient with regard to the activity of blogging. 
Before Physics
Certain forms of knowledge gathering rely on this cognitive act being organised through its 
accompanying a real physical journey: a physicalisation of the mobile act of learning.  The 
orthopractic methodologies associated with medieval scholars, in which the initiate would 
be required to make a significant journey, passing particular waystations and perhaps 
overcoming difficulties, are built into the logic of some religious training regimes, and are 
preserved in rituals such as the ‘stations of the cross’. Often associated with the acquisition 
of spiritual or religious knowledge, this ambulatory epistemology is distinct from a form of 
learning based on the consumption of object-like facts. Mary Carruthers, writing in ‘The 
Craft of Thought’ (1998), draws the lines of this distinction through the terms ‘orthodoxy’ 
and ‘orthopraxis’. 
Orthodoxy explicates canonical texts, whereas orthopraxis emphasises a 
set of experiences and techniques, conceived as a ‘way’ to be followed, 
leading one to relive the founder’s path to enlightenment (Carruthers, 
1998: 1).
These ‘canonical texts’ are here portrayed as artifacts which are pushed out and away into 
scopic space through some kind of explicatory process carried out by orthodoxy.  Once 
there they could only presumably be treated as possessive data, which is exactly not the 
point of this kind of knowledge. Instead, what is desired is a means of embodying knowing 
which does not keep it at a remove but which brings it into the body.  The orthopractic 
journey is aimed at carrying out this progressive embodiment.   The ‘way’ that is referred to 
here is not only metaphorical, suggesting the procedural knowledge gained through 
                                                
56 The connections between walking and knowing, and indeed the haptic practice of ‘making’ were 
extensively examined in the 2005 conference Walking as Knowing as Making: a peripatetic investigation of 
place, hosted by the University of Illinois.  Abstracts and synopses pertaining to this conference are available 
at http://www.walkinginplace.org/converge/intro.htm  (Accessed 25/06/08)
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spiritual craft.57  It is also made concrete and literal in, for example, the architecture of 
some medieval churches, about which John Onians suggests,
Every step taken in a Christian church, every passage in liturgy, 
potentially involved psychological transformations and the dramatic 
realisation of some bold metaphor such as rebirth or salvation. (1988: 60)
This particular passage is revealing in that it points up the parallel between not only space 
and knowing, but also between space, and knowing, and liturgy or language.  The 
explicatory space into which the walker is progressively stepping is not only a space of 
techne but also of langue.   There is the sense that the unrolling of the scroll toward the 
revealed explicitus is simultaneously narrated.
This metaphorical connection between moving, knowing, and language is carried by the 
term ductus which features in historical rhetoric.  Carruthers describes this concept as;
… flow and movement, as through an aqueduct – we can think of the 
ornaments in a composition as causing varieties of movement: steady, slow, 
fast, turn, back up.  They not only signal how something is to be “taken” 
(like a pathway) – whether straight on (literally) or obliquely 
(metaphorically or ironically) – but can also give an indication of temporal 
movement, like time signatures in written musical composition.  
Compositional ductus, moving in colors and modes, varies both in direction 
and in pace, after it takes off from its particular beginning (the all-important 
point “where” one starts) toward its target (1998: 116).
This literal walking and its alternation with metaphors for thinking and reading is 
developed further in Carruthers (1998).  Referring to the 12th Century Benedictine, Peter of 
Celle, she cites him as giving this advice for reading biblical scripture;
In this book (of Genesis) journey through the greater part of your reading, 
coming to paradise…Walk with God, like Enoch … Enter the Ark at the 
time of the Flood … So go with a deliberate but light step through the 
contents of this book … interpreting what is obscure, retaining and 
                                                
57 The ‘spiritual exercises’ of Loyola may serve as an example of this ‘way to knowledge’.  Originally 
written around 1522, the exercises are available online at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/loyola-
spirex.html (Accessed  25/06/08).
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memorizing what is straightforward.  Whenever you enter a pleasant 
meadow of prophetic blessings, loosen the fold of your garment, stretch your 
belly, open your mouth and extend your hand … Then come to Exodus 
(grieving for) the entry in Egypt … Then admire the foreshadowing of our 
redemption in the blood of the sacrificial lamb.  Observe how the law was 
given on Mt. Sinai and how it is open to spiritual understanding.  By 
progressions of virtues run through the forty-two stopping places (in the 
Sinai) with what they signify.  With an Angelic mind construct within 
yourself the Tabernacle and its ceremonies. (1998: 109)
It seems to be suggested that the knowledge to be gained from this scripture cannot be 
acquired if the scripture is thought of as a single, solid object, remotely observable through 
the distanced and empirical eye.  Rather it should be considered as a space into which the 
reader enters with all of their senses intact.  The reader may be invited to employ their 
scopic, fog-dispelling intellect to ‘interpret what is obscure’ or to ‘observe how the law was 
given’, but they are also directed to ‘stretch the belly, open the mouth, and extend the 
hand’.  The injunction here is to employ not only the metaphorical sense of sight but also 
the haptic feeling touch of the hand and body.  This is in marked contrast to the examples 
of ‘clean language’ that were introduced earlier in which such non-visual allusions were 
suppressed as needlessly poetic.  This mobilisation of multiple sensory modes as means of 
conceptualising knowledge, and the understanding of knowledge space not as optically 
translucent and smoothly Newtonian is typical of pre-Enlightenment modes of thought (see 
Ball, 2008, Manchester, 1992).  This rich epistemology was largely refined out of approved 
discourse, and it is perhaps only through recent developments such as ecriture feminine, the 
various ‘geographies’ (sensuous, situated, viewpointed etc.) and, particularly with regard to 
this writing, the argument that all discourse, and all thought, may be ultimately 
metaphorical and poetic, that this knowing through sensus communis is staging something 
of a return. This passage above from Peter of Celle primarily draws upon the logic of 
movement and different types of walking (running, going with a deliberate but light step) to 
conceptualise what he regards as appropriate types of reading.  In other words, in may not 
be enough simply to present the space and allow the reader to walk through it.  They may 
choose to wander aimlessly in circles and so gain nothing; or they may execute a militarily 
precise, but possibly inappropriate, frontal assault on the text, rushing through it from 
beginning to end along the shortest possible route.  Peter suggests that neither of these 
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would effect the desired result, which can only be achieved by proceeding carefully and 
with awareness of the landscape of ideas through which one is moving; this passage 
requires careful scrutiny; this benefits from a more relaxed handling; here is a place to 
catch one’s breath58.
After Physics
Jasminko Novak of the Information Management Research Group at the University of 
Zurich, who works and writes extensively on the impact of new technologies on knowledge 
management, has referred to certain practices as requiring ‘nomadic knowledge’.  His use 
of this term acknowledges that users of, particularly, the Web 2.0 environment tend to 
access this space in a wide variety of different ways, and each access point brings with it its 
own context, protocols, limitations, and conventions.  As he indicates, 
People are becoming more and more nomadic in respect of using ICT 
services. Nomadic means that users frequently change between different 
settings that include both desktop and mobile devices, in very different 
spatial and social contexts (office, home, on the road, public spaces, events, 
communication and socializing). They need to use different devices, 
platforms and different kinds of knowledge and communication (explicit, 
implicit, formal, informal) (Novak, 2005).59
Novak is a director of The MARS Interactive Experience Lab at the Fraunhofer Institute of 
Media Communications, and the mission statement of this organization contains this, 
possibly illuminating, ambition.
The research staff works in the field of eCulture on new forms of 
communication and interaction among the human body, art, and technology, 
                                                
58 This kind of ‘directed’ reading reminds me of the work of artists Wrights and Sites, whose practice 
include the so-called ‘Mis-guides’.  These works tend to involve walks through re-imagined spaces in which 
participants are offered ways of engaging with these places in new and revealing ways.  http://www.mis-
guide.com
59 Available online at ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/ist/docs/so/collab-
work/prop_fraunhofer_media_commu.doc (Accessed 5/08/08)
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as a means of developing multi-modal interfaces as “tools for the art of 
tomorrow” and as the cultural technology of mobile life. On the basis of its 
core competency in the design of interactive systems, the lab’s staff carries 
out R&D projects focusing on processual environments, at the center of 
which are human beings with their sensory capacities and cultural qualities. 
Artistic strategies and scientific experimentation engender new concepts. 
Research is currently concentrated on “knowledge-based arts—knowledge-
based media” and “nomadic knowledge computing,” which deal with the 
perception and design of intermedial spaces of knowledge and 
communication60.
The term ‘intermedial’ which Novak introduces in the final sentence of this quotation has 
become something of a buzz word over the last two to three years, with a large number of 
publications entering the market claiming to describe, define, critique, or otherwise engage 
with the concept it may be suggestive of.  A recent call for papers for an academic 
conference in the area of intermediality described the theme of intermediality as follows:
Intermediality is associated with the blurring of traditionally ascribed 
generic and formal boundaries through the incorporation of digital media 
into all forms of cultural practice, and the presence of one or more media in 
the space and form of another medium. This has led to the creation of 
intermedial spaces in-between media and a proliferation of texts, inter-texts, 
hyper-texts, hyper-fictions, and acts of remediation, transmediality, 
multimediality, hypermediality and a bewildering blur of associated realities. 
We live in an increasingly intermedial world where the human-computer 
interface places us in the position of being in-between media and the 
different realities they create. Intermediality is the modern way to 
experience life; where reality is glimpsed through computer screens and 
reached through fingers tapping mobile phone touch pads. In this screen-
saving world we are not sure what is ‘live’ and what is ‘mediatized’ and if 
we can differentiate between them anymore. Through digital technology, 
intermediality has become part of the global phenomenon that has the ability 
to link cultural communities in cyberspace. However, intermediality may 
also operate at the level of the individual artist as a medium using their 
body, voice and mind to inter-act with other media, and crucially, in the 
perception of the receiver/critic who interprets the intermedial scene.61
                                                
60
http://www.aec.at/en/archives/festival_archive/festival_catalogs/festival_artikel.asp?iProjectID=13370
61 This is the text of a call for papers for The Journal of Culture, Language, and Representation. Vol. 5 
(2008) distributed on academic mailing lists, including the GMANE Cutural Studies list, archived at 
http://article.gmane.org/gmane.culture.studies.general/7164 (Accessed 29/07/09).
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In its extensive invocation of borders, boundaries, intermediate spaces and liminal zones it 
seems to want to partake of the logic of territoriality (albeit as heckler on the margins).  At 
the same time the gesturing toward blurring and confusion, the inability to differentiate, the 
bewilderment and the plain ‘not being sure’ smacks of someone claiming the high ground 
of the panoptic whilst simultaneously making a virtue of their own myopia.  As a term I 
personally find it unhelpful because of the inherent lack of any metaphorical schema 
through which it might operate.  
The use that Novak is making of the term is, I suspect, much more grounded in the 
mechanics of digital communication and the bottom line of Knowledge Management than 
adrift between metaphors of liminality and obfuscation.  The intermedial space that Novak 
is referring to is a consequence of life on the move between one media point and another, in 
which the type of knowledge one might access, and the way that knowledge might present 
itself, varies from point to point.  This kind of nomadism is the result of a proliferation of 
media and is the logical response to that proliferation.  To return briefly to the point at 
which this writing began, the possibilities of delivering knowledge in other formats than the 
traditional doctoral thesis, hard bound and superlatively objective, may also be a natural 
consequence of the nomadic possibilities of ‘intermediality’.  
What is particularly significant is that both these approaches to the text require the 
embodied sense-making presence of the guided reader.  In the case of the Medieval text 
there is the necessary metaphorical engagement of the different senses as the script varies in 
tone and ductus; in the latter example there is the active negotiation of differing information 
sources tied to different media access points.  In neither case is the text a smooth network 
of connections spread across the vacuum of an optically transparent space, ‘the centre of 
which is everywhere and the circumference nowhere’, (to paraphrase Pascal62).  Nor is it a 
featureless fabric; the ‘tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture’, 
which Roland Barthes describes (1977: 146).  There is no sense of the disembodied space 
                                                
62 Pascal used this image to describe a cosmology poised between the Divinely created, human-
centered universe of Ptolemy and the featureless infinity offered by Copernicus and mapped by Newton.  An 
excellent imaginative account of the provenance of this image can be found in the short story by Borges The 
Fearful Sphere of Pascal in 
BORGES, J. L. (1962) Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings, New York, Grove Weidenfeld.
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in which meaning is inevitably endlessly deferred into the nowhere of the objective view. 
The space narrated by Peter of Celle has a centre of narrative gravity out of which protrude 
not only the eyes but also the hands and feet of the reader.63  It is a space which takes its 
measure from the man and is meaningless without this meditation.  The intermedial space 
suggested by Novak, even though it is separated from Peter’s by 600 years and the 
migratory movement of script to screen, is similarly inhabited.  Unlike the 
‘multidimensional space in which a number of writings, none of them original, blend and 
clash’ (Barthes, 1977: 146); a space essentially devoid of being, the practices of both 
occupy the three-dimensional space of human being-in-the-world.  As Heidegger describes 
it,
What is meant by “Being-in”? Our proximal reaction is to round out this 
expression to “Being-in” ‘in the world’”, and we are inclined to understand 
this Being-in as ‘Being in something’ ….as the water is ‘in’ the glass, or the 
garment is ‘in’ the cupboard. By this ‘in’ we mean the relationship of Being 
which two entities extended ‘in’ space have to each other with regard to 
their location in that space (Heidegger et al., 1962: 69).
The space in which this embodiment is most at home provides the schema for the 
organization of this epistemology.
Conclusion - Walking and Talking and Feeling and Writing and Blogging
The general paradigm which underpins this research has perhaps best been summarised by 
Mark Johnson when he wrote that; ‘Meaning and thought emerge from our capacities for 
perception, object manipulation, and bodily movement’. (2007: 113)
                                                
63 Polanyi also invokes the Copernican/Newtonian paradigm to critique the application of reason over
sense; he writes ‘Thus, when we claim greater objectivity for Copernican theory, we do imply that its 
excellence is, not a matter of personal taste on our part, but an inherent quality deserving universal acceptance 
by rational creatures. We abandon the cruder anthropocentrism of our senses, but only favor in of a more 
ambitious anthropocentrism of our reason’  
POLANYI, M. (1958) Personal knowledge: towards a post-critical philosophy, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press. 4-5.
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Knowledge, in all its forms, is a category of meaning and thought, and therefore also 
figures within these capacities.  The main aim of this writing has been the detailed 
unpacking of this central idea with particular reference to the blog The Conference Report.
A major argument that has been developed is that the particular form of knowledge that we 
think of as ‘objective’ is thought of in that way for specific reasons, and that these reasons 
appear through the embodied capacities that Johnson specifies, particularly the sensory 
mode of seeing and the spatial properties of distance and detachment.  It has been 
demonstrated that this set of capacities operates within a metaphorical space in which 
objective and other forms of knowledge are distinguished from one another according to a 
logic grounded in the schematic consistency of the body’s physical engagement with the 
actual space of lived experience and being-in-the-world.  It has further been shown that the 
phenomenological notion of the ‘object’, which underpins the abstract concept of 
‘objectivity’, is more complex than might be immediately apparent, as are its relations with 
‘perception’ and ‘bodily movement’, and indeed ‘space’. Whilst offering appropriate 
respect for scientific empiricism and logical deduction, it has been shown that the structure 
of these schema render certain aspirations toward the formulation of ‘objective knowledge’ 
problematic, particularly with regard to forms of knowing which function according to 
different entailments of the spatial and sensory spectrum.  Possible alternative metaphors 
for forms of knowing which avoid the misleading objectivity of inappropriate visuality 
have been offered, primarily those of touch and walking.  
By placing objective knowledge in the wider conceptual framework of embodied cognition 
through the application of a theoretical line which runs through phenomenology, cognitive 
poetics, conceptual metaphor, and image schema; a framework has been provided that 
allows for the organised consideration of forms of knowing which do not aspire to the 
condition of the object.  These forms of knowing may be instantiated and expressed 
through the medium of certain Web 2.0 technologies, particularly the blog, which is 
disposed, it is argued, to a breaking down of the subject/object binary.
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Although this analysis is not intended to be a comprehensive examination of the changes 
apparently wrought on knowledge by the development of new media technologies, it has 
been shown that much of the language and explanatory frameworks associated with these 
changes employs the same metaphors and schematic images as those under discussion here.  
Spatial, geographical, and sensorimotor metaphors abound, with the descriptions of new 
media epistemologies typically invoking conceptual image schemas which reframe 
knowledge in terms of these alternative conceptual metaphors.  To this extent, blogging 
serves to exemplify the use of these metaphors.  
In summation, what this writing indicates, and what is made manifest within the blog The 
Conference Report, are the following. 
 The rules of form through which blogs are composed offer an approach to the 
acquisition, development, and sharing of knowledge which, although contested, is 
gaining increasing validity in the academy.  To the extent that such contestation is a 
result of inarticulacy in the expression of how this knowledge is constructed, this 
writing contributes toward the development of an appropriate epistemology.
 A metaphorical analysis of the different epistemological systems presented here 
demonstrates that there is coherence amongst them which suggests that they are 
grounded in shared conceptual metaphors and common image schema.
 Practice-based research, including screen-based digital practices such as blogging, 
tends to be difficult to express using the objectifying language of empirical 
discourse because it relies on different elements of the metaphorical schemas 
through which knowledge is made coherent.  It has been shown that metaphors for 
types of knowing which draw on touch and movement have particular application to 
practice-based research.
 New media technologies give concrete form to concepts which would otherwise be 
difficult to grasp.  Just as the development of hypertext and hypermedia transformed 
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the poststructuralism of Barthes and Derrida from opaque theorization into the 
(literally) digitally-embodied practice of link-clicking, so Web 2.0, and particularly 
blogging, makes manifest the orthopractic acquisition of haptic and ambulatory 
knowledge.
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Post Script
This document began with a preamble, a moment of pause before setting out on this guided 
tour through The Conference Report.   During the course of the tour the going has been 
joined by knowing, and speaking, and thinking, and writing, and it seems fitting that what 
began as an amble ends as a script.  The walks that I take with my dogs in the morning, 
which seem immaterial and irrecoverable at the time of their execution, have somehow left 
their muddy footprints all over the internet and are now preserved for all time in electronic 
aspic.  All that was air has congealed into writing, to which writing this is the post script.  
And in this writing and in this epistemology, and in repetition of repetition of quotation and 
in the fabric of quotation, it is easy to forget the pleasure of the blog and the pleasures of 
the flesh.  So let me just say this; I have had a great time writing The Conference Report.  I 
love walking my dogs, Phoebe and Guy, by the canal, along the Salt Line, through the field 
with the white horse, talking to myself and remembering as much as I can.  I love getting 
home with the dogs wet and smelly from their swimming in the stream that runs through 
the field where I lost my mobile phone.  I love sitting down at my laptop when the dogs are 
reasonably dry; it is now 6.45 a.m. and the children aren’t up for another fifteen minutes.  I 
love the coffee steaming beside my laptop, in the mug that used to say ‘Twin Palms’ on the 
side.  I love the Windows XP startup fanfare. I love the tiny bumps on the ‘F’ and ‘J’ keys 
on the keyboard, which tell me where my index fingers are.  I love my children and my 
dogs and my wife, and I love the feel of the words rolling out across the screen and across 
the world, starting nowhere and ending everywhere, each entry marked with the time and 
the date.  
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